- Position‹2 of 2
- No, humans should not strive for immortality
- Argument1 of 2›
A life without an ending would lose the shape that makes it matter
The argument
Proponents of this position argue that mortality is not simply a limit on life but part of what gives life its structure. Choices matter because time is finite: to study one subject is to forgo another, to spend a decade with one person is not to spend it with someone else, and the weight of those decisions comes from their irreversibility. Remove the horizon, they argue, and the pressure that makes a commitment meaningful goes with it. Everything becomes postponable, because there is always more time in which to do it, and a project that can always be started later is not quite a project at all. The argument extends to the things people value most. Urgency, on this view, is what turns affection into devotion and interest into vocation, because people care intensely about what they will lose. Proponents suggest that an indefinite existence would flatten that intensity into something milder, pleasant enough perhaps, but without the seriousness that comes from knowing a life has a shape and will be completed. They often add that the art, religion and philosophy people find most profound are largely concerned with finitude, which they take as evidence that an awareness of ending is bound up with meaning rather than merely opposed to it. Defenders of the position distinguish this from a welcome of suffering. They do not argue for shorter lives or against treating illness; they argue that a life should have a span, and that the right ambition is to make that span healthy and complete rather than endless. On this account humans should not strive for immortality, because an ending is not an external imposition on a life but one of the conditions under which a life is able to mean anything.
Premises
Counter-arguments
Critics answer that this reasoning would justify any amount of death if it were sound, and that nobody applies it consistently: no one argues that a life cut short in childhood is more meaningful for being shorter, or that the dying should be denied treatment to preserve their sense of urgency. They also deny that meaning depends on a scarcity of time. People immersed in work, love or curiosity do not experience those things as valuable because they will end; they experience them as valuable in themselves, and an indefinite span would simply allow more of them. Some add that the argument is a rationalisation formed under a constraint nobody could escape, and that its appeal would not survive the constraint being lifted.
Rejecting the premises
[Rejecting P1] Critics object that if finitude conferred weight, shorter lives would be weightier still, which nobody accepts. [Rejecting P2] They argue that people with long horizons still pursue demanding projects, so an indefinite span need not make everything postponable. [Rejecting P3] They reply that conceding a span should be healthy and complete already grants that length is good, which undercuts drawing a line at any particular point. [Rejecting C] They conclude that the argument dignifies a limit nobody chose rather than identifying a genuine condition of meaning.