A work is not identical with its maker, and judging one by the other misdescribes both

The argument

Proponents of this position argue that the case against consumption rests on treating a work as an extension of a person, and that this is not what a work is. Once made, it exists independently: it can be understood by people who know nothing of its origin, it carries meanings its maker did not intend, and what audiences find in it is not controlled by whoever assembled it. On this account the moral character of a maker is a fact about the maker, and transferring it to the object is a confusion rather than a judgement. The argument is reinforced by how most works come about. Films, records, books and products are the labour of many people, most of whom have had nothing alleged against them, and to treat the result as the possession of one person is to erase the rest. Proponents hold that a norm of withdrawal consequently distributes its costs almost at random, falling on collaborators, on later audiences and on whatever the work itself contributed to a field, while having at most a marginal effect on the person it is aimed at. Proponents add that the alternative principle is unlivable once stated plainly. Almost nothing anyone consumes is free of a person who has done something serious, and the reason this is tolerable in general is that consumption is not ordinarily read as endorsement. They argue that the standard should not change according to how salient a maker's conduct happens to be, and that holding it steady is what distinguishes a principle from a reaction. On this view a person may consume the work, deplore what is alleged, and find no inconsistency between the two.

Premises

Counter-arguments

Opponents answer that the separation is cleaner in theory than in practice, since reputation, royalties and future commissions attach to a named person whatever the philosophy of the artwork says. A second objection is that the appeal to collaborators cuts the other way: collaborators are also people whose working conditions are set by whoever holds power on a production, and continuing demand keeps that power in place. Others argue that independence of meaning is irrelevant to the question asked, which is not whether a work can be appreciated on its own terms but whether a person should pay for it now, while the proceeds and the standing still flow to someone facing allegations of this kind.

Rejecting the premises

[Rejecting P1] Whatever is true of a work's meaning, its proceeds and its prestige attach to a named person, so independence of interpretation does not make consumption independent of the maker. [Rejecting P3] That consumption is not usually read as endorsement reflects inattention rather than a principle, and practices can be mistaken for as long as nobody examines them. [Rejecting C] The conclusion answers a question about appreciation while the dispute is about payment and attention, which continue to reach the accused person however the work is interpreted.