Can interdependence theory of international relations explain the geopolitical system?

Asymmetric dependence is an instrument of coercion, not a limit on it

Question: Can interdependence theory of international relations explain the geopolitical system?
Position‹2 of 2: No, interdependence theory cannot explain the geopolitical system
Argument‹2 of 2: Asymmetric dependence is an instrument of coercion, not a limit on it

The argument

The second objection grants the facts of linkage and rejects the inference drawn from them. Interdependence theory reads mutual connection as a brake, because each party stands to lose from a rupture. Critics argue that connection is almost never mutual in equal measure, and that where it is unequal it becomes a weapon rather than a restraint. The mechanism is straightforward. If two states are linked through a channel, and one of them can replace that channel at moderate cost while the other cannot, then the threat to close it is credible for one party and not the other. The less dependent state can demand concessions it could not otherwise obtain, and can do so without firing a shot or paying much of a price. On this reading, the thicker the linkage, the larger the stock of leverage available to whichever side needs it less, and theories that aggregate the relationship into a single quantity of mutual exposure hide precisely the inequality that does the work. Critics add that states understand this and act on it. Governments invest in reducing their own dependence while preserving the dependence of others, maintain inventories and alternative suppliers for the inputs they cannot do without, and treat chokepoints in finance, shipping, energy and technology as strategic assets to be held rather than as shared infrastructure to be protected. That behaviour is difficult to square with a system in which linkage functions as a constraint. It makes sense immediately in a system where linkage is a form of power, which is why proponents of this position hold that interdependence theory identifies something real about the modern system and then misreads what it is for.

Premises

[P1]Interdependence theory treats mutual connection as a restraint, because both parties would lose from a rupture. [P2] Dependence within a channel is rarely symmetrical, and the party who can replace the channel more cheaply faces a smaller loss from closing it. [P3] That asymmetry makes a threat to sever the link credible for one side and not the other, which converts the link into leverage. [P4] States behave accordingly, working to reduce their own dependence while preserving that of others and holding chokepoints as strategic assets. [C] Linkage therefore operates as an instrument of coercion rather than a limit on it, and a theory that aggregates it into mutual exposure misreads the system it describes.

Counter-arguments

Defenders of the theory answer that this is a refinement rather than a refutation, and that accounts of complex interdependence have always treated asymmetry as the place where bargaining power comes from. The disagreement is then about emphasis rather than about mechanism. They add that leverage of this kind is self-limiting in a way raw force is not: a state that uses a chokepoint teaches every other party to route around it, so the weapon degrades with use and the holder has reason to threaten rather than strike. That is still a constraint on behaviour, and it is one the theory supplies.

Rejecting the premises

[Rejecting P1] The theory does not treat connection as a simple brake; accounts of complex interdependence make asymmetry the source of bargaining power, so the objection restates part of the theory as though it were a rival to it. [Rejecting P3] A credible threat to sever a link is not costless to the threatener either, since the dependent party is usually also a customer, a supplier or a creditor, and the asymmetry is rarely as clean as the argument needs. [Rejecting C] Leverage and restraint are not alternatives; a system in which linkage can be used coercively is still one in which the cost of using it shapes what states attempt, which is what the theory claims.