Both are attempts to change another person's mind, and the dilemmas follow from that alone

The argument

Proponents of this position argue that the ethical questions in play arise from the attempt to alter what someone else thinks, and that both practices make that attempt. Whether the instrument is a reason or an appeal, one party is trying to leave another party believing something they did not believe before, and every question worth asking about honesty, manipulation, respect and consent arises at that point rather than later. The mechanism proponents identify is that argumentation involves choices which are themselves persuasive and which carry the familiar ethical risks. Someone constructing an argument decides which reasons to present and which to omit, how much weight to give an objection, where to begin, what to treat as common ground and what to leave unstated. None of these choices is dictated by logic, all of them affect the outcome, and each can be made candidly or with an eye to what will land. Proponents argue the arguer therefore faces the same temptations as the persuader, and faces them continuously. Proponents add that the test is whether a dilemma can be named that belongs to one practice and not the other. Misrepresenting the strength of a case, exploiting the audience's ignorance, choosing a moment of distress to press a point, concealing an interest in the outcome: each of these can be done with reasons as readily as with appeals. On this account the apparent contrast between the practices is a contrast between a careful arguer and a careless persuader, which says nothing about the methods and everything about the people. Compare like with like and the ethical terrain is identical.

Premises

Counter-arguments

Critics argue the account flattens a real difference in what each practice is accountable to. An arguer who misrepresents the strength of a case has violated the standard they were working under, whereas a persuader who does so has used the standard, and that is a difference in kind rather than in the character of the practitioner. They add that the argument proves only that argumentation can be abused, not that it carries the same dilemmas: a practice with an internal corrective and a practice without one differ even when both are being misused. Others object that treating all mind-changing as ethically alike leaves no way to distinguish teaching from pressure.

Rejecting the premises

[Rejecting P1] Critics argue the premise locates the ethics too early. What matters is not that a mind is to be changed but by what route, and the distinction between running through the other party's assessment and around it is exactly what the premise sets aside. [Rejecting P2] The point about selection and emphasis is accepted and its force denied. Those choices are themselves assessable as reasons once noticed, whereas the devices characteristic of persuasion are not, so the arguer's discretion is subject to a check the persuader's is not. [Rejecting P3] Critics object that a dilemma arising in both practices need not arise equally. Misrepresentation is available to an arguer as a violation of their own standard and to a persuader as an ordinary use of theirs, which is a difference the premise cannot register.