Compatibilism or soft determinism

The argument

“Compatibilism isn’t easy to explain. But it seems to jibe with our gut instinct.” In this deterministic universe, is it possible for a person to be fully morally responsible for their actions? Compatibilism is an explanation that seems illogical, but argues that although your actions and choices are predetermined, that does not mean you’re not free. Free will can exist even if determinism is true, as determinism is not absolute. The universe operates with law-like order, and past actions determine the future. But, there is also something different about some human actions and some of the actions we take are really free. So, if we ask whether a person jumps off a diving board or is pushed, in both cases the action is determined - it couldn’t not happen. But when the action of an agent is self-determined (e.g. they choose to jump), the action should be considered free. Alternatively, if we cannot separate external and internal causes, maybe the answer is to say actions are more or less free? Patricia Churchland rejects the free/not free dichotomy but instead says we should ask not ‘do I have control?’ but ‘how much control do I have?’ This combines the determinist nature of the universe with the feeling of being free. The philosophical implications could be that “when one forms an intention to act, one is significantly disposed to act but not yet fully committed. The commitment comes when one finally decides to act." Evolution, history and culture have endowed us with feedback systems that give us the unique ability to reflect and think things over and to imagine the future. Free will and determinism can co-exist.

Premises

Counter-arguments

Hard determinists and libertarians alike attack compatibilism as a redefinition that dodges the real question. Hard incompatibilists (such as Galen Strawson or Derk Pereboom) argue that calling a determined action 'free' just because it flows from the agent's own desires ignores that those desires were themselves fully caused by prior events the agent did not choose — so the 'self-determination' is as fixed as being pushed off the diving board, only with an extra causal link. Libertarians counter from the other side that genuine freedom requires the ability to have done otherwise, which strict determinism denies; a feeling of being free is not the same as being free. On both critiques, compatibilism keeps the words 'free will' only by quietly lowering the bar, reconciling the positions verbally rather than substantively.

Rejecting the premises

[Rejecting P1] Self-determined choices are still fully caused by prior desires and states the agent did not choose, so labelling them 'free' does not escape the determinist chain — it merely adds a link to it. [Rejecting P2] Libertarians argue genuine freedom requires the ability to have done otherwise, which determinism denies, so the compatibilist 'feeling of freedom' is not the freedom at issue in moral responsibility.

Further reading

Kane, R. (2016). The complex tapestry of free will: Striving will, indeterminism and volitional streams. Synthese 1–16.