The role is inherently political

The argument

This argument holds that Supreme Court justices need not remain apolitical because the role itself is inherently political: constitutional judging cannot be performed without making value-laden choices, so demanding apolitical justices demands something the job makes impossible. The core of the claim concerns what constitutional interpretation actually involves. The great constitutional phrases — equal protection, due process, free speech, cruel and unusual punishment — do not apply themselves. Deciding what they mean for abortion, voting rights, gun regulation or executive power requires choosing among interpretive philosophies, weighing liberty against order and individual rights against majority rule. Those are precisely the questions that divide political life, and different justices answer them differently depending on the perspectives and values they bring to the text. There is no neutral, mechanical method that delivers the answers; if there were, cases would not split the Court along recognisable philosophical lines. The institution's design confirms the point. Justices are nominated by presidents and confirmed by senators in openly political contests, fought hard precisely because everyone understands that a justice's outlook will shape national policy for decades. The Court's rulings settle contested public questions and bind the elected branches — an exercise of power over political life by any honest description. Proponents conclude that the demand for apolitical justices asks for a pretence, and pretence has costs: it lets ideological judging masquerade as neutral technique, beyond scrutiny. Better to acknowledge that justices hold political philosophies, examine them openly, and judge nominees accordingly. Because the role is inherently political, this argument holds, Supreme Court justices need not remain apolitical.

Premises

Counter-arguments

The argument equivocates between two senses of 'political'. That constitutional interpretation requires contestable value judgements establishes that judging is not a mechanical procedure — a point few dispute. It does not establish that justices may properly behave as partisans: voting to advantage a party, coordinating with political actors, or selecting the outcome first and the reasoning afterwards. Those are the practices the demand for apolitical justices actually targets, and they remain coherent demands even if a value-free method is unavailable. The inference from a political appointment process to a political role also runs backwards. Many offices are filled through nakedly political contests and are nonetheless expected to be exercised independently once occupied — central bankers, inspectors general, election administrators, career prosecutors. How someone arrives at a post does not settle the norms governing conduct in it. Predictable ideological splits are weaker evidence than the argument suggests. Justices who disagree consistently about how to read a text will divide consistently in the cases where the text is most open, which is what sincere and durable methodological disagreement looks like from outside; the pattern is equally consistent with the interpretation the argument rejects. Critics add that the argument's remedy carries the higher cost. A court commanding neither purse nor sword depends on being seen as deciding by law rather than by preference, and a bench that openly announces its members as political actors invites the elected branches, and the public, to treat its judgements as merely one more political claim.

Rejecting the premises

[Rejecting P1] That interpretation requires value judgements shows judging is not mechanical; it does not license partisanship, which is the conduct the apolitical norm targets. [Rejecting P2] Political appointment does not fix the norms of an office — central bankers, inspectors general and election officials are appointed politically and expected to act independently — and the Court's authority depends on being seen to decide by law rather than preference.