Exercise of religious freedom must not hurt others

The argument

Many rights are circumscribed when they are in opposition to another competing right. We see this when we balance the right to bear arms and the right to life; the right to privacy and the right of others to safety. Few rights are absolute and override all else. The general rule of thumb we apply to such rights is that their exercise depends on whether or not they cause harm to others. So too with the right to religious freedom - it is acceptable only when it does not harm others. This is the general principle that allows us to live in a society that is increasingly diverse and must become increasingly tolerant. There are multiple way in which the refusal of service harms LGBT individuals. The first is the emotional strain of being turned away again and again from establishments for reasons beyond their control. The second is that they may not be able to access the service if they are repeatedly turned away by all the providers in their region. This is particularly important if we consider the fact that this case may not be limited to same-sex weddings, but rather to the greater question of whether it is permissible to refuse service to a person specifically because of their sexual orientation. If any business can refuse a service to customers because they are LGBT, this puts a significant constraint on the lives of LGBT individuals.

Context

Religious freedom is also the bedrock of this particular argument. More specifically, how we aim to balance it with the competing right to non-discrimination of LGBT individuals.

Premises

Counter-arguments

Those on the other side argue the 'harm' here is contested and asymmetric. Being declined one expressive service by a single vendor, where alternatives exist, is not the order of harm — violence, loss of life — that the rights-balancing analogy invokes, whereas compelling someone to create a message against their conscience is itself a real burden on a competing right. They contend the principle 'freedom must not harm others' proves too much, since almost any refusal causes some disappointment, and that the law already distinguishes refusing a customer because of who they are (impermissible) from declining to endorse a particular message (a narrower, protected space). The 'no provider left in a region' scenario, they add, is asserted rather than demonstrated.

Rejecting the premises

[Rejecting P1] The gun-versus-life analogy pairs a freedom against grave physical harm; declining one expressive commission where substitutes exist is not obviously the same order of harm. [Rejecting P3] Emotional strain and inconvenience are real but fall short of the concrete harm the balancing test contemplates, and the claim that all regional providers would refuse is hypothetical.