Guerrilla-Style Warfare made the US lose the Vietnam War

The argument

After 1965, Ho Chi Minh and General Giap, the leaders of the North Vietnamese communist forces, made the decision to avoid pitch battles at all costs. They adopted hit-and-run ambush tactics instead. The decision meant that engagements would happen when and where the communist forces chose them, so that the war was fought on terms they had selected rather than terms the US could impose. The infrastructure behind those tactics was extensive. The NLF and Vietcong built an extensive network of tunnels which were used as fighting bases, and they built it with labour drawn from the population around them: they put the local villagers to work, and each villager had a quota, having to dig three feet of tunnels a day. One of the most extensive tunnel networks is clearly visible at Cu Chi. The network consists of nearly 200 miles of tunnels, including an underground conference room, kitchens, and a training area — not a set of hiding places but a functioning base, with planning, supply and training held below ground where they could not be reached. Hidden trapdoors connected the tunnels with the surface and provided ample opportunities to ambush patrolling US platoons, letting an attacking force appear, engage and disappear without ever presenting a position to fight against. These guerrilla tactics meant that the US rarely had the upper hand in Vietnam. US forces could not match the Vietcong's combat skills in dense jungle terrain, where their opponents’ familiarity with the ground counted for most. Nor could it neutralise their ambushes, because the tactic offered no fixed target to destroy. A force that cannot meet its opponent's chosen method of fighting cannot convert its strength into a result, and on this account that is what cost the US the war.

Context

The communist forces learnt the importance of guerrilla warfare during the First Indochina War against the French. At the battle of Dien Bien Phu, General Giap had led his communist forces against the French colonisers. The communists won, but when they employed traditional warfare strategies, the communists suffered heavy casualties. During the Giap unleashed a “human wave” at French positions incurring vast losses. Giap learnt the lessons from the First Indochina War. He knew that to defeat a larger military power, his forces could not engage them in traditional warfare strategies. He took these lessons to the Vietnam War and they shaped the strategies he employed against the US forces.

Premises

Counter-arguments

The body counts and kill ratios show that the US forces consistently won skirmishes with the communists. At the battle of Ia Drang, after three days of fighting, the allied US and South Vietnamese forces lost around 600 men. The communists had lost around 3,000. During the Tet Offensive, one of the pivotal battles of the Vietnam War, the Northern Vietnamese forces suffered losses of around 50,000, compared to the US and ARVN losses of 2,000 and 4,000 respectively.

Rejecting the premises

[Rejecting P1] The tactical picture is incomplete. Much of the fighting after 1965, and the 1968 offensive in particular, involved regular North Vietnamese formations in conventional engagements, so the war cannot be reduced to ambush and tunnel. [Rejecting P2] By the measure the argument implies, US forces generally prevailed in engagements; the 1968 offensive cost the communist side enormously and destroyed much of the southern insurgent infrastructure. Losing the battles while winning the war is exactly what this model cannot explain. [Rejecting P3] The premise pitches at the wrong level. Guerrilla tactics imposed cost and time; what converted cost into defeat was the political question of how long the United States would keep paying it — which is the case the sibling positions make.