Meaning that is chosen rather than inherited is the only kind a person can own

The argument

A second argument treats nihilism as a clearing operation rather than a destination. Proponents accept that people need commitments to live by, but argue that commitments received ready-made are not really the person's own: they were absorbed before there was anyone to assent to them, and they are held because they were never examined. Recognising that no purpose is written into the world removes the authority those inherited commitments relied on, and leaves the individual to decide what, if anything, to pursue. Proponents argue that what is built afterwards is more securely held than what it replaced. A value adopted in full knowledge that nothing external underwrites it is maintained because the person endorses it, not because they fear the consequences of abandoning it or have never imagined doing so. On this account the nihilist conclusion is compatible with caring intensely about particular people, kinds of work or ways of living; what it rules out is the claim that those attachments are obligatory for everyone, which proponents regard as an inflation that was never justified. The position is also defended as a matter of honesty. Proponents hold that the available accounts of built-in meaning are ones their adherents cannot establish, and that believing them because they are consoling is a decision to be deceived. A further consequence is drawn for how people treat each other: if no one has access to a purpose written into things, then nobody is in a position to impose their ends on anyone else by appeal to that purpose, and the tolerance usually defended on other grounds follows directly. Proponents conclude that the advantages of nihilism are not only private relief but a more honest and less coercive footing for living alongside others.

Premises

Counter-arguments

Critics argue that this is not nihilism but existentialism wearing its clothes, since a position that ends with chosen values, honesty and tolerance has quietly reinstated three things that matter. If nothing matters inherently, they ask, why does it matter that a value is one's own rather than inherited, or that a belief is honest rather than consoling? Each preference needs a standard the position says does not exist. They add that the tolerance said to follow does not: from the premise that nobody has access to a built-in purpose, nothing follows about how people should be treated, and someone who concluded that they may therefore do as they like would be reasoning just as validly from the same starting point.

Rejecting the premises

[Rejecting P1] Commitments absorbed early are not thereby unexamined, since people revisit inherited values throughout their lives and often endorse them on reflection. [Rejecting P2] A value held because the person endorses it still needs a reason why their endorsement makes it worth holding, and the position denies there is one. [Rejecting P3] Nothing about how people should treat each other follows from the absence of built-in purpose, so the tolerance claimed here is imported rather than derived. [Rejecting C] A conclusion that ends in authenticity, honesty and tolerance has reinstated values the argument began by denying, which makes it a doctrine of chosen meaning rather than nihilism.