Moral judgement attaches to what a person does, not to a figure on a balance sheet

The argument

A second objection is about the form of the judgement rather than the facts. Opponents argue that moral assessment applies to actions, intentions and character, and that a quantity of assets is none of these. Two people holding identical fortunes may differ completely in how they obtained them, how they treat the people who work for them, what they do with the proceeds and what they are trying to achieve, and a moral vocabulary which cannot distinguish between them has stopped tracking anything moral. Declaring the holding itself a failing collapses that distinction by definition. Opponents argue that the practical consequences of this collapse are not trivial. If the fortune is the offence, then there is nothing a holder can do about it except cease to hold it, and conduct becomes irrelevant: paying well, dealing honestly, declining political influence and giving at scale all leave the person equally condemned. This removes the incentive that moral criticism exists to create, and it tends in practice to be applied selectively, with the same wealth drawing censure or admiration depending on the holder's politics or likeability rather than their behaviour. Opponents add that the real object of the complaint is usually structural. Concentration of wealth at this scale raises genuine questions about political influence, dynastic inheritance, market power and the fairness of a tax system that treats returns on assets more gently than wages. These are questions about rules, and they are answered by changing rules, through taxation, competition policy, inheritance law and transparency. Directing the criticism at individuals who are complying with the rules as they stand both misplaces the responsibility and leaves the arrangement that produced the concentration entirely intact.

Premises

Counter-arguments

Proponents of the charge reply that holding a fortune is itself a continuing action, not a static fact: the money could be deployed and is not, and a decision taken repeatedly is exactly the sort of thing moral judgement applies to. They argue that the demand for conduct-based assessment is satisfied on their account, since the conduct at issue is retention. On selectivity, they argue that inconsistent application is a criticism of critics rather than of the principle. And they contend that the appeal to rules is a way of ensuring nothing is ever said, since the rules are shaped by the political influence that great fortunes purchase, so waiting for the rules to change leaves the beneficiaries of the present ones both unaccountable and in charge of the remedy.

Rejecting the premises

[Rejecting P1] Retaining a fortune is a continuing decision rather than a static fact, and decisions are precisely what moral assessment applies to. [Rejecting P2] The distinction between conduct and holding is preserved on the opposing account, since the conduct at issue is the choice to retain. [Rejecting P3] Inconsistent application of a criticism is a fault in the critics rather than evidence that the criticism is wrong. [Rejecting C] Deferring to rules leaves the remedy with people whose political influence shapes those rules, which is itself part of the objection.