No, proper morality prioritizes the reduction of suffering.

The argument

A common form of morality, utilitarianism, insists there be symmetry. Increases in happiness and reductions in suffering of equal weight are of equal importance. Negative utilitarianism advocates for the reduction of suffering to be prioritized, as the consequences of moral symmetry pose danger to society. Moral symmetry makes no sense when the two values are compared. The greatest happiness principle does not have the moral urgency that avoidable suffering has. Karl Popper stated that "human suffering makes a direct moral appeal for help", while the same can’t be said for increasing "the happiness of a man who is doing well anyway". Although utilitarianism can help reduce suffering, weighing happiness the same “can be an excuse for a benevolent dictatorship”. Preventing suffering should be of the greatest moral importance. This approach echoes Buddhism’s Noble Truths; (universal) suffering cannot be compensated by happiness. Furthermore, Buddhism shares the same asymmetry as negative utilitarianism. Simply put, those who promised paradise on Earth through moral symmetry “never produced anything but a hell”. Proper morality is universal compassion, the prioritization of reducing suffering over what should be considered a private matter.

Premises

Counter-arguments

Negative utilitarianism faces two problems in application. First, removing the greatest happiness principle from moral thought would inevitably negatively affect one’s well being, therefore creating more suffering. Furthermore, the most efficient way to prevent suffering is to stop human life from existing. “If a ruler controls a weapon that is capable of instantly and painlessly destroying the human race...consequently the use of the weapon is bound to diminish suffering, and would be the ruler’s duty on Negative Utilitarian grounds”. This cannot be considered practical or beneficial to morality, let alone the diminishment of suffering.

Rejecting the premises

[Rejecting P1] The asymmetry is illustrated rather than argued. That an appeal for help feels more urgent than an opportunity to add to the happiness of someone already comfortable is a fact about moral psychology, and the premise treats it as a fact about moral weight. The two come apart: urgency also tracks proximity and vividness, which nobody takes to be morally decisive. [Rejecting P2] Neither support carries the weight given it. Agreement between negative utilitarianism and the Noble Truths shows a view has been held in more than one tradition, not that it is correct, and the Buddhist account of dukkha belongs to a doctrine of craving and release rather than to an aggregation principle. The dictatorship worry argues against a style of reasoning rather than for the asymmetry, and it rebounds: taken strictly, minimising suffering is most efficiently achieved by ending the existence of beings who can suffer, which is the objection the premise leaves standing. [Rejecting C] The conclusion also changes the subject. The position claims morality relieves more suffering than it creates; the premises argue for one theory of what morality ought to prioritise, which leaves that comparative claim about morality's actual effects untouched.