Rejecting development leaves the poorest with nothing better in its place

The argument

A second argument against the false-promise view concerns what follows from accepting it. If the promise is false, proponents of this position ask, what is offered instead? Mass poverty is not a stable baseline that a country can comfortably choose to remain at; it means children dying of treatable illness, work that wears bodies out early, and no reserve against drought, illness or a bad harvest. Every arrangement that has actually lifted large populations out of that condition has involved more productive work, more energy, more industry and more exchange with other countries. Proponents argue that a position calling that process illusory owes an account of some other route, and that no demonstrated alternative has been put forward. They also press on whose interests the argument serves. On this view, telling poorer countries that convergence is unavailable sits comfortably with the interests of countries that would rather not face new industrial competitors, and with a strand of rich-world opinion that prefers poorer countries picturesque and unindustrialised. People in those countries, proponents argue, have been consistent about wanting the things development brings, such as electricity, schools, hospitals and paid work off the land, and are entitled to be the judges of whether the promise is worth pursuing. The position therefore reframes the critique rather than dismissing it. The legitimate complaints are about terms: debt that cannot be serviced, rules written by the already rich, finance that arrives with conditions. Those are arguments for changing the terms on which development happens, and proponents argue that this is a different and more useful claim than saying the whole prospect was a deception.

Premises

Counter-arguments

Those who hold the promise false reject the claim that their position leaves nothing in its place. They point to provision of health, schooling, housing and energy organised around need rather than export earnings, to debt cancellation, and to claims on the wealth already accumulated by the early industrialisers, all of which they regard as routes out of poverty that do not depend on convergence. They also deny that the choice is between development and picturesque poverty: the objection is to a specific model of export-led growth towards rich-country consumption, not to electricity, hospitals or paid work.

Rejecting the premises

[Rejecting P1] That past escapes from mass poverty took this form does not show it is the only available form, and the premise treats the historical record as though it exhausted the possibilities. [Rejecting P2] Alternatives have been put forward, among them provision of health, schooling, housing and energy organised around need, debt cancellation and claims on wealth already accumulated elsewhere; the premise dismisses them by requiring that they already be demonstrated at scale. [Rejecting P3] If the legitimate objections really do concern debt, rules and conditional finance, then the terms are what make the promise misleading, which concedes the opposing position rather than refuting it. [Rejecting C] The conclusion rests on an argument from consequences: that a claim is discouraging is not a reason to think it false.