The answer turns on facts that differ from one family to the next

The argument

Proponents of this position hold that the question as posed cannot be answered, because the cases it covers have very little in common. At one end is a relative who repeats something ugly absorbed long ago, has never acted on it, and visibly dislikes being challenged about it; at the other is one who harasses a family member, organises his life around the conviction, and treats his household as a platform for it. Proponents argue that a single answer covering both is either far too permissive at one end or far too harsh at the other, and that the appearance of a principled dispute between the other two positions is partly an artefact of each side having a different case in mind. The position names the facts it thinks decide particular cases: whether the conduct is a stated view or a practice; whether it is directed at identifiable people, and whether those people are inside the family; whether the person can be challenged or responds by escalating; whether contact is safe; what the affected relatives themselves want; and what else the relationship consists of and who else depends on it. Proponents hold that these vary independently of one another, so the combinations do not collapse into two kinds of case. What the position rejects is the demand for a rule, not the seriousness of the question. Proponents agree that the view is wrong and that nobody holding it has any claim to be agreed with. They hold that what follows from that, in a particular family, is a judgement the people in it are better placed to make than any general principle is, and that the honest answer to the question as asked is that it depends on which case is in front of you.

Premises

Counter-arguments

Opponents argue that this is less a position than a refusal to take one, and that it is the answer most convenient for people who would rather not act. They point out that in practice the facts listed are not assessed neutrally: the relative doing the assessing is usually the one with the most to lose from a break, and a standard that invites case by case judgement reliably resolves in favour of keeping the peace. A further objection is that both of the other positions already allow for the extremes described, so what looks like a third view may be a restatement of one of them with the hard cases removed.

Rejecting the premises

[Rejecting P1] Opponents hold that a range of severity does not prevent a general answer, since moral rules routinely cover cases that differ in degree. [Rejecting P2] Both of the other positions already make room for the extremes, so the dilemma the premise poses is weaker than it appears. [Rejecting P3] The facts listed are not assessed neutrally, because the relative doing the assessing usually has the most to lose from a break. [Rejecting C] A standard that invites case by case judgement reliably resolves in favour of keeping the peace, which makes it a position in practice rather than the absence of one.