The dilemmas of persuasion are visible, and visible dilemmas get governed

The argument

Proponents of this position argue that the ethical problems of persuasion, though real, are the kind that societies notice and act on, whereas the problems of argumentation are not. Because persuasion is openly understood as an attempt at influence, it attracts scepticism, conventions about disclosure, expectations that interests be declared, and standing suspicion of anyone who is good at it. Proponents argue this does not eliminate the problems but keeps them under management, which is the most that can be asked of any practice. The mechanism is that scrutiny follows acknowledged power. A practice that admits it is trying to move people invites the question of who is paying for it and what they want, and that question gets asked routinely. A practice that presents itself as the pursuit of truth through reasons does not invite it, so the interests of the person reasoning stay unexamined. Proponents argue the result is that the characteristic abuses of argumentation, such as the selective case assembled to look like an inquiry, have no corresponding watchfulness directed at them and accumulate unchallenged. Proponents add that the same contrast appears in how each practice trains its audience. Exposure to open persuasion makes people sceptical, and scepticism is a transferable defence. Exposure to argumentation conducted under a neutral frame trains people to follow a chain of reasoning to its end, which is a valuable skill and also precisely the vulnerability an interested arguer needs. On this account the practice whose dilemmas are hardest to address is the one that arrives dressed as the solution, and persuasion at least has the merit of arriving as a problem.

Premises

Counter-arguments

Critics argue the account confuses how a problem is managed with how serious it is. That persuasion attracts suspicion shows the dilemmas are grave enough to need it, not that there are fewer of them, and a practice requiring constant external policing is in a worse position than one with an internal standard. They add that the scepticism described is poorly aimed, protecting audiences against clumsy persuasion while leaving them open to the skilled kind. Others object that the argument would make any practice less problematic merely by being distrusted, which cannot be right, since distrust is a response to the problems rather than a reduction of them.

Rejecting the premises

[Rejecting P1] Critics argue that attracting scepticism is evidence of severity rather than of manageability. The conventions described exist because the practice was found to be dangerous, which counts towards the dilemmas being more serious and not fewer. [Rejecting P2] The claim that scrutiny follows acknowledged power is disputed. Interested reasoning is in fact scrutinised heavily wherever stakes are high, through disclosure of interests, review by others and the expectation that a case be answerable to objection. [Rejecting P3] Critics contest the account of what audiences learn. Habitual scepticism towards persuasion tends to be indiscriminate, protecting people against clumsy attempts while leaving them credulous towards skilled ones, so it is not the transferable defence the premise describes.