How do coup d'etats and coup attempts happen?

A coup succeeds by convincing others that it has already succeeded

Question: How do coup d'etats and coup attempts happen?
Position‹3 of 3: Coup attempts are more likely when there is a strong chance they will succeed
Argument‹2 of 2: A coup succeeds by convincing others that it has already succeeded

The argument

A second argument offered for this position concerns how a coup actually works on the night. Proponents note that plotters are almost never strong enough to defeat the state's forces in a contest. A handful of units cannot beat an army. What they can do is present the removal of the government as something that has already happened, so that the rest of the army is choosing not whether to join a rebellion but whether to resist a new government. On this account a coup is less a battle than a claim, and it succeeds when the claim is believed. The argument is that this makes every participant's decision depend on what they expect everyone else to do. An officer who sides with plotters who then fail is a traitor. An officer who defends a government that then falls is an obstacle to the people now in charge. Neither has any interest in being early and wrong. Proponents argue that this explains the characteristic tactics: seizing the broadcasting station before the barracks, acting in the small hours, announcing that order has been restored and the armed forces are united behind the change, and claiming the support of commanders who have not yet decided. Each is an attempt to manufacture the expectation on which the outcome depends. Holders of the view draw a conclusion about why attempts happen at all. If success is largely a matter of what others believe will happen, then anything which makes a coup look likely also makes one more likely, and the belief partly brings about what it predicts. Proponents argue that this accounts for the clustering of attempts in states that have had them before, where nobody needs persuading that the army might take over, and for their near absence elsewhere, where a plotter would have to overturn a general assumption that such an attempt would fail.

Premises

[P1]Plotters are rarely strong enough to defeat the state's forces, and instead present the change of government as something already accomplished. [P2] Each officer's best response depends on what others are expected to do, since being early and wrong is punished either way. [P3] The characteristic tactics of a coup, such as seizing broadcasting before barracks and claiming united support, are attempts to manufacture that expectation. [C] A coup succeeds by making its success appear likely, so conditions that make a coup look likely make attempts more likely.

Counter-arguments

Opponents argue that the mechanism describes the conduct of a coup rather than its causes, and that the distinction matters, since knowing that plotters try to appear victorious tells us little about why these plotters, in this state, at this moment. They also point out that outcomes are frequently decided by force after all, where a presidential guard or a loyal division simply defeats the attempt, which the account has to treat as a failure of belief rather than of strength. Several add that the self fulfilling element is overstated, since states with long histories of coups also tend to have the divided armies and contested institutions that rival explanations rely on.

Rejecting the premises

[Rejecting P1] Attempts are often decided by force after all, where a loyal guard or division defeats the plotters outright, so the contest the premise rules out does occur. [Rejecting C] States where coups appear likely also tend to have divided armies and contested institutions, so the clustering may be explained by those conditions rather than by expectation.