A genome is shared with relatives, so no one person can own it

The argument

The first objection to individual ownership of DNA is that the thing to be owned does not belong to one person. A genome is substantially shared with parents, siblings and children, and a sequence read from one person reveals a great deal about all of them. If ownership means the right to exclude others from a thing, opponents argue, then genetic ownership is incoherent: the same information would simultaneously be the property of everyone it describes, and each owner's exercise of their right would interfere with the others. The practical consequences are said to follow directly. If each relative owns their share, then disclosing a family medical history, or consenting to a test that implicates siblings, would require permissions that no one can realistically assemble, and a single refusal could block a diagnosis another family member needs. If instead the person who provides the sample owns it outright, then they hold a property right over information about relatives who never agreed, which is worse than the situation ownership was introduced to remedy. Opponents argue that there is no way to divide the entitlement that does not either paralyse ordinary medical practice or license one family member to decide for the rest. Opponents conclude that the shared character of genetic information calls for a different legal form altogether. Instead of asking who owns a genome, they argue, the law should impose duties on whoever holds genetic data: duties to keep it secure, to use it only for stated purposes, to refrain from inference in employment and insurance, and to delete it on request. Duties can be owed to several people at once without contradiction, which is exactly what information shared among relatives requires, whereas exclusive ownership cannot be held by several people over the same thing.

Premises

Counter-arguments

Proponents of ownership reply that shared interests do not defeat property elsewhere: land, companies and inherited estates are routinely co-owned, and the law has well-developed rules for joint holdings and for acting in the interests of all holders. They argue that the paralysis objection assumes the most demanding possible rule, when ownership could instead be structured so that each person controls their own sample and the readings taken from it, leaving relatives free to do the same. The alternative on offer, they add, is not obviously stronger: duties bind only those who accept them and are enforced only where a regulator chooses to act, while an ownership right gives the individual a claim they can bring themselves without waiting for an agency to take an interest.

Rejecting the premises

[Rejecting P1] That a genome is shared is agreed, but sharing does not prevent each person from controlling their own sample and the readings taken from it. [Rejecting P2] Co-ownership of land, companies and estates shows that the law can handle rights held jointly over one thing. [Rejecting P3] The paralysis described follows only from the most demanding possible consent rule, not from ownership as such. [Rejecting C] Duties bind only the holders a regulator chooses to pursue, whereas an ownership right lets the person affected bring a claim themselves.