Making DNA ownable would create a market in genomes that the poorest would supply

The argument

A second objection is that ownership is a transferable right, and that what can be owned can be sold. Opponents argue that this is not an incidental feature to be legislated away but the defining characteristic of property: a right to exclude others is valuable precisely because it can be waived for a price. A regime of genetic ownership would therefore establish a market in genomes, and the people most likely to enter it are those for whom the payment matters most. Supplying one's genetic data would become one more thing the poorest can sell and the comfortable need not. Opponents expect the pressure to appear as conditions rather than as offers. Once genetic data is a tradeable asset, employers, insurers, service providers and platforms can make parting with it a term of something the person needs, and a right that may be waived will be waived routinely by people in no position to negotiate. On this view, converting a protection into an asset predictably weakens it: the individual gains a right to say no that they cannot afford to exercise, and loses the shelter of a rule that simply forbade the demand from being made. The alternative opponents favour treats certain uses of genetic data as impermissible regardless of consent. Prohibiting genetic discrimination in employment and insurance, limiting retention, requiring purpose limitation and barring onward transfer protect everyone equally, including those who would have agreed under pressure, because they do not depend on the individual's bargaining position. Opponents argue that rights of this kind are what protect people in practice, and that inalienable protections are worth more to those most at risk than a saleable entitlement would be.

Premises

Counter-arguments

Proponents answer that property rights are routinely made non-transferable where legislatures want them to be, and point to entitlements that may be held but not sold. The commodification worry, they argue, describes the present situation better than the proposed one: genetic data is already collected, aggregated and monetised at scale, and the only party excluded from the proceeds is the person it came from. They also argue that prohibiting particular uses is not an alternative but a complement, and that bans are hard to police precisely because the individual has no standing to enforce them. Giving people a right they can assert themselves, proponents say, adds a layer of protection that does not depend on a regulator noticing a breach after the fact.

Rejecting the premises

[Rejecting P1] Legislatures routinely create entitlements that may be held but not sold, so transferability is a design choice rather than a necessary feature of the right. [Rejecting P2] A market in genetic data already exists among collectors and aggregators; the only party presently outside it is the person described. [Rejecting P3] Making particular demands unlawful addresses conditions of service directly, and is compatible with rather than an alternative to an ownership right. [Rejecting C] Inalienable limits are hard to enforce when no individual has standing to sue, so a personal right complements rather than undermines them.