- Argument‹2 of 2
A government installed by a coup gives armed opponents a reason to fight
The argument
A second argument offered for this position runs in the other direction, from coups to wars. Proponents note that a coup does something to a state beyond changing who holds office: it removes the procedure by which office changes hands. Whatever its defects, a constitutional route to power is a route rivals can take without fighting. A government that arrived by force has demonstrated that the route is unavailable, and demonstrated at the same time which route is available. The argument is that this changes the position of everyone the new arrangement excludes. A group that might have waited for an election has nothing to wait for. A claim that the government is illegitimate, which an armed movement ordinarily has to construct and persuade people of, is supplied ready made and widely believed, which makes recruitment easier and makes outside support easier to justify. Proponents emphasise the effect on the losing side of the coup itself, since officers and officials who are purged are trained, armed, networked and now excluded, which is an unusually direct supply of the people an insurgency needs. Where the coup followed factional lines inside the armed forces, the defeated faction may leave with the units it commanded. Holders of the view conclude that the two kinds of violence form a cycle rather than a sequence. A war produces an army liable to seize power; the seizure produces a government without a settled claim to rule and a pool of armed opponents with little to lose; that conflict produces another army of the first kind. Proponents argue that this is why coups and civil wars appear together in the same states across long periods, and why explanations that treat either as the root cause tend to describe one turn of a loop.
Premises
Counter-arguments
Opponents argue that coups are often followed by consolidation rather than war, and that a successful one may end a conflict by settling who rules, which the position has to treat as the exception. They also note that constitutional succession is frequently nominal in the states where coups occur, so a coup removes a route that excluded groups did not in practice have. Others question whether the cycle explains anything, since describing coups and wars as mutually reinforcing accounts for states where both recur but not for why they began, and not for the states that escape the pattern after a single turn of it.
Rejecting the premises
[Rejecting P2] Constitutional succession is frequently nominal in the states where coups occur, so the route the premise says is removed was often unavailable already. [Rejecting C] Many coups are followed by consolidation rather than conflict, and some end an existing war by settling who rules, so the conclusion overstates the regularity of the cycle.