How do coup d'etats and coup attempts happen?

Officers have institutional interests a government can threaten directly

Question: How do coup d'etats and coup attempts happen?
Position‹2 of 3›: Coup attempts are likely when there is military dissatisfaction with the government
Argument‹2 of 2: Officers have institutional interests a government can threaten directly

The argument

A second argument offered for this position concerns what the armed forces want as an institution, separately from what any officer thinks about politics. Proponents describe a standing set of interests: a budget, modern equipment, control over promotion and discipline, autonomy from civilian interference in operational matters, protection from prosecution for past conduct, and a recognised place in national life. Each of these is something a government can grant or withdraw, which makes the armed forces a political actor with a stake in who governs, whatever the formal doctrine of civilian control says. The argument is that governments threaten these interests in recognisable ways, and that the sharpest threats are those which make waiting more dangerous than acting. Cutting a budget or cancelling equipment is a grievance. Appointing officers by loyalty rather than seniority, building a parallel force answerable directly to the leader, or opening prosecutions of serving officers is closer to an attack on the institution and on the individuals inside it. Proponents emphasise the effect of purges in particular: an officer who expects to be removed has little left to lose by moving first, and colleagues who expect the same have a reason to coordinate. A government setting out to protect itself by these means can convert a diffuse grievance into an urgent and shared one. Holders of the view add that being committed to a war the government will not supply belongs in the same category. Officers sent to fight without equipment, reinforcement or a coherent objective, and then blamed for the result, acquire a grievance that is professional rather than ideological, and one they can describe as a duty to the soldiers under them. Proponents argue that this is why attempts so often follow defeat or a settlement the officer corps regards as a betrayal, and why the explanation does not require those involved to hold any political programme at all.

Premises

[P1]The armed forces have institutional interests in budgets, equipment, promotion, autonomy, legal protection and prestige, all of which a government controls. [P2] Measures such as loyalty based appointments, parallel forces answerable to the leader and prosecutions of serving officers threaten the institution and the individuals in it at once. [P3] An officer who expects to be removed gains by acting first, and colleagues expecting the same have a reason to coordinate, so such measures make a shared and urgent grievance out of a diffuse one. [C] Coup attempts arise from the armed forces defending institutional interests a government has threatened, and need not involve any political programme.

Counter-arguments

Opponents argue that measures of this kind are at least as likely to prevent a coup as to provoke one, which is why governments use them. Dividing command, promoting on loyalty and maintaining a counterweight force reduce the ability of any faction to act, and the record includes many armies that were purged and did not move. They also note that the position is close to unfalsifiable, since a government that leaves the military alone is accused of permitting a rival power centre to grow while one that intervenes is accused of provoking a reaction. Others add that officers who claim to be defending the institution are frequently defending their own positions within it.

Rejecting the premises

[Rejecting P3] Measures that divide command and promote on loyalty also reduce the ability of any faction to coordinate, so they can suppress an attempt as readily as provoke one. [Rejecting C] Officers who present a coup as a defence of the institution are often defending their own positions within it, so the conclusion takes the stated motive at face value.