- Position‹2 of 3›
- Regulating clinical trials
- Argument‹2 of 2
Trial regulation is also what protects the people evidence is gathered from
The argument
A second argument offered for this position rests on a feature that distinguishes this stage from every other. In a clinical trial, people are deliberately exposed to something whose effects are not yet known, in order to produce knowledge that will mostly benefit others. Proponents note that no other part of the drug regulation system has that structure. Inspection concerns objects and facilities. Surveillance observes treatment that was going to happen anyway. A trial creates the exposure, and it creates it in the name of evidence. The argument is that this generates obligations which only trial regulation can discharge. Someone must establish that a participant understood what they were joining and agreed to it without being pressed, which is harder where the alternative is no treatment at all, where the participant is a patient of the investigator, or where payment is a significant inducement. Someone must judge, independently of the sponsor, whether the question is worth asking and whether the risk is proportionate to it. Someone must ensure a trial stops when it becomes clear that one arm is being harmed, and that this judgement is not left to a party with an interest in continuing. Proponents emphasise that these are not scientific refinements but the conditions under which it is permissible to run the trial at all. Holders of the view argue that this makes the stage uniquely difficult to delegate. A manufacturing standard can be audited by a third party and a safety signal can be analysed from a database, but consent, independent review and the authority to halt a trial are exercised in real time over people who are already enrolled. They add that the obligation does not depend on the medicine succeeding, since a participant who was not properly informed has been wronged whether the trial produces a useful result or not.
Premises
Counter-arguments
Opponents accept the ethical claim and dispute what follows from it. Research ethics committees, institutional review and the law on consent already discharge these duties, and in most systems they sit outside the drug regulator, so the obligation does not establish where a regulator should concentrate. They also argue that the position changes the subject, because the question asks what makes the best system of drug regulation, which concerns the medicines a population ends up taking, and an answer grounded in the treatment of trial participants addresses a smaller group and a different kind of claim. Some add that excessively cautious trial regulation has its own victims, in treatments that arrive late or never.
Rejecting the premises
[Rejecting P2] Surveillance is not merely observational where a regulator licenses on thin evidence and relies on use to complete the picture, since that also exposes patients to effects not yet known. [Rejecting P3] Ethics committees and the law on consent already perform these real time functions in most systems, and they sit outside the drug regulator. [Rejecting C] Obligations owed to trial participants concern a smaller group than the population taking licensed medicines, so they do not settle the organising priority of drug regulation.