It is too difficult to get rid of the Electoral College

The argument

Rising levels of polarisation amongst voters and political deadlock in the United States Congress makes it increasingly difficult to get rid of the Electoral College, particularly as both of the major parties have self-interest in its maintenance. To reform or get rid of the Electoral College would require a constitutional amendment with two-thirds majority in both houses of Congress and three quarters of states ratifying it, which has only happened twenty seven times since the United States was founded over two hundred years ago. There is currently not a majority in favour of abolishing the Electoral College. Therefore the time could be better used to address more pressing issues.

Premises

Counter-arguments

The argument answers a question about what should happen with a prediction about what will. Difficulty of enactment is a fact about political feasibility, not a reason to favour the institution, and taken as a general principle it would retire every reform argument ever made: abolishing slavery, extending the franchise and enfranchising women were all, at the time, harder than this. A defence of keeping the Electoral College has to say something good about the Electoral College, and this one says nothing. The amendment record is also presented as evidence for the wrong conclusion. Twenty-seven successful amendments is twenty-seven proofs that the bar can be cleared, and several concern presidential selection directly — the Twelfth restructured how electors vote, the Twenty-Second capped terms, the Twenty-Third gave the District electors, the Twenty-Fifth rewrote succession. The mechanism the argument calls prohibitive has repeatedly been used on precisely this part of the constitution. The amendment route is not the only one either. The National Popular Vote Interstate Compact aims to bind participating states to award electors to the national vote winner once signatories reach a majority of the electoral college, which requires no amendment at all. Whatever its merits, its existence refutes the claim that only the hardest available path is available. The claim about public opinion is also less settled than stated: surveys have found majorities favouring a national popular vote at many points, and majorities in any case shift. Finally, the closing move — that time would be better spent elsewhere — is an argument about agenda-setting that would apply equally to almost any constitutional question, and it concedes the debate rather than joining it.

Rejecting the premises

[Rejecting P1] Twenty-seven successful amendments demonstrate that the threshold can be met rather than that it cannot, and several concern presidential selection specifically — the Twelfth restructuring how electors vote, the Twenty-Second, Twenty-Third and Twenty-Fifth all amending this part of the constitution; the amendment route is also not the only one, since the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact would operate through state law once signatories reach a majority of electors. [Rejecting P2] Current majorities are contingent and shifting, and surveys have found majorities favouring a national popular vote at many points; a claim about present political conditions cannot establish a permanent obstacle. [Rejecting C] The conclusion does not follow from the premises: difficulty of enactment is a fact about feasibility rather than a reason to favour an institution, and as a general principle it would retire every reform argument, including those for abolishing slavery and extending the franchise — a defence of keeping the Electoral College needs to say something in its favour, which this argument does not attempt.