The House of Lords should partially be elected

The argument

Supporters of reform rather than abolition begin by conceding the central charge: the House of Lords is undemocratic. Peers are not chosen by the electorate, and on that count the chamber cannot be held to account by the people whose laws it helps shape. The argument holds, however, that this observation identifies one feature of the chamber and not its whole character, and that abolition would discard the rest along with the defect. What would be discarded, on this view, is the important role the Lords performs in offering expert technical scrutiny of the Government's legislative programme. The claim is not merely that peers happen to be knowledgeable, but that the chamber's composition and its detachment from elections work together. Because peers have no need to seek re-election, they sit outside the partisan debate that shapes the conduct of those who do: they have no constituency to court, no campaign to fund and no seat to defend. Proponents argue that this is what allows peers to assess legislation independently, on its merits, and to press on technical defects in a bill that a chamber facing the electorate would have reason to let pass. The undemocratic character of the chamber and the independence supporters value are, on this account, two aspects of a single arrangement, which is why removing the first risks removing the second. Reform is therefore presented as the response that takes both considerations seriously rather than trading one away. Any reform should seek to enhance the chamber's legitimacy and its accountability to the electorate, while also preserving its existing strengths. Supporters conclude that the best approach is a balance: a proportion of peers elected, so the chamber can claim a democratic mandate for the authority it exercises, and a proportion appointed on the basis of their expertise, so that the scrutiny survives the change. Partial election, on this view, is what a chamber that is both accountable and expert actually requires.

Premises

Counter-arguments

Partial reform of the House of Lords would not satisfy public demands for democratic accountability. Nor would it end the practice of party leaders selecting donors, former staff, or former Members of Parliament to sit in the upper chamber, undermining any claims of expertise. Instead, partial reform runs the risk of pleasing no one. Leaving those who advocate a fully elected upper chamber upset about continued political appointments and undermining the claim by supporters of the current House of Lords that it sits independently outside of narrow partisan politics.

Rejecting the premises

[Rejecting P3] Making the House of Lords partially elected would not fix how undemocratic it is.