Monism categorizes the soul and body as one

The argument

Monism, generally accredited to have begun with the philosophies of Aristotle, characterizes the soul and body as the same rather than as two things joined together. The word points to the core commitment: in general, monism refers to the idea of one core entity. On this account we are one entity made up of a body and soul working together to allow us to function — not a soul housed inside a body, but a single functioning whole that can be described in two vocabularies. That commitment settles what a soul can be. If there is only one entity, then a person's essence is resultant and dependent upon their body. The things that make up who someone is — their experiences and their personality — are influenced and driven by physical events and perceptions: what the senses deliver, what the body undergoes, what happens to it over a life. The soul on this view is not a separate thing receiving those inputs from outside; it is constituted by them, which is why a change to the body is also a change to the person rather than merely a change to the person's circumstances. The conclusion about death then follows without further assumptions. If the soul depends on the body both for its content and for its operation, it cannot continue once the body stops. When the body dies, the soul does not have the ability to function independently, because independent functioning was never something it was capable of in the first place. There is therefore no afterlife on the monist account. Set against dualism, which treats soul and body as distinct substances that can come apart, monism is the second of the two theories philosophy has developed here. They divide on whether a person is one thing or two, and what happens after death follows from that answer.

Premises

Counter-arguments

The body and soul should be viewed in a separate dualism approach. The soul is a spiritual thing that cannot be explained or tied to the physical body. The soul does interact with but doesn't rely upon the body, and they exist in separate spheres that coexist but are independent. After the death of the body, the soul remains functional in the afterlife.

Rejecting the premises

[Rejecting P1] The dualist reply denies the unity the premise asserts, holding that body and soul are distinct: the soul is a spiritual thing that cannot be explained in physical terms or tied to the body, and the two occupy separate spheres that coexist without merging. [Rejecting P2] Interaction is not dependence on this account — the soul acts on and with the body without being driven by it, so a person's essence need not be a product of their physical constitution. [Rejecting P3] If the soul does not depend on the body, the body's death does not end it, and the counter holds that it remains functional in the afterlife.