Should people be able to choose what country to live in?

High-performing economies would see flooding from opportunists

Question: Should people be able to choose what country to live in?
Position‹3 of 3: No, the choice of assigning citizenship should be down to the state
Argument1 of 2›: High-performing economies would see flooding from opportunists

Economic centre-points such as London, New York and Hong Kong already suffer from overcrowding. They provide a microcosm for why population density needs to be regulated- and why continual economic growth sees diminishing returns.

The argument

Space is not always the issue. A key point at the heart of the border control debate in Europe is the lack of infrastructure to support an indefinite influx of immigrants. This is particular evident in countries with nationalised healthcare and heavily tax-dependent public services- they cannot simply accommodate a rapidly increasing population, and economic growth will not expand alongside them indefinitely. No doubt, recent mass immigration in Europe has been seen as a humanitarian issue foremost, with the moral imperative to aid those fleeing war zones by providing asylum. But if leaders such as Angela Merkel really thought their nation would benefit economically from such an unprecedented flooding in of refugees- as she claimed in 2015- they were misguided. For Germany, the result was not an expanded economy, but mass unemployment from new arrivals. Only 63% of migrants in the EU are employed according to current statistics, 10 points lower than the average for native citizens. It doesn’t help that a proportion of asylum-seekers are often economic opportunists with fabricated histories. This is the unfortunate product of lenient border control policies, and a treatment of immigrants that does little do discourage a ‘foot in the door’ attitude. The core issue doesn’t change if we simply see immigrants as world citizens. A theoretical aim to dispel bureaucracy is held back by logistical restraints: numbers matter.

Premises

[P1]Countries with nationalised healthcare and tax-dependent services lack the infrastructure to absorb an indefinite influx of people. [P2] Germany's experience after 2015 shows the economic strain, with migrant employment well below that of native citizens and some arrivals being economic opportunists. [P3] Open movement would let high-performing economies be flooded faster than their growth and services can bear. [C] Therefore, to manage these numbers, the choice of assigning citizenship should be down to the state.

Counter-arguments

Critics respond that the 'flooding' scenario is not borne out: migration flows are shaped by jobs, language and existing networks, not by open invitations, and even large intakes like Germany's post-2015 saw employment rates among arrivals rise steeply over a longer horizon — the 63% snapshot captures a lag, not a permanent ceiling. They argue the infrastructure objection is a case for investment and managed integration, not for state monopoly over citizenship, and that describing asylum-seekers as 'economic opportunists with fabricated histories' characterises a policed minority rather than the rule. Treating migrants purely as costs, they add, ignores the tax, labour and demographic contributions ageing economies draw from them.

Rejecting the premises

[Rejecting P1] Tax-funded services also gain revenue and workers from migration, so whether they can absorb newcomers is a question of investment and timing, not a fixed ceiling. [Rejecting P2] Germany's post-2015 employment gap narrowed sharply as arrivals learned the language and cleared asylum backlogs, so the early snapshot overstates a permanent drag. [Rejecting P3] 'Flooding' assumes movement is driven by opportunity alone, but migration is constrained by jobs, cost, language and social networks, so open movement would not produce unlimited inflows.