Historically, there were no drinking age laws

The argument

Proponents of this position treat minimum legal drinking age laws as a historical contingency rather than a necessary feature of a functioning society. Such laws, they argue, are largely an invention of the early 20th century, and they still do not exist in many nations in Africa and Asia. On this view the burden of justification falls on the law rather than on its removal: a rule that most of human history managed without, and that large parts of the world continue to manage without, cannot be presumed indispensable simply because it is familiar. The United Kingdom is offered as the illustrative case. It had no national minimum drinking age law until 1923, when the Intoxicating Liquor (Sale to Persons under Eighteen) Act was passed following advocacy by members of the temperance movement. Supporters draw attention to what happened next: the movement that secured the law had itself declined by the mid-20th century, leaving the statute in place after the campaign and the moral outlook behind it had faded. The law, on this account, outlived its own rationale and survives through inertia rather than through any continuing case having been made for it. The argument then adds an effectiveness claim. Drinking age laws are said to have little effect on underage drinking, so the restriction does not even deliver the outcome it was introduced to secure. Combining the two strands, proponents conclude that these are relics of the legal past: measures with a specific and now expired origin, no demonstrated benefit, and no counterpart in the many nations past and present that have got by without them. On that basis they hold that the laws should be abolished altogether and that there should be no drinking age.

Premises

Counter-arguments

The historical premise is an appeal to tradition that carries no normative weight. That drinking-age laws were largely invented in the 20th century, or that some countries still lack them, says nothing about whether they are beneficial now — seatbelt laws, food-safety standards and child-labour restrictions are all recent inventions absent in parts of the world, and no one treats their novelty as an argument for repeal. The claim that the laws 'have little effect on underage drinking' is asserted rather than shown, and it is contested: research on minimum-age laws, particularly the US move to 21, reports measurable reductions in youth drinking and in alcohol-related traffic fatalities, which is why many jurisdictions retain them. The argument also slides from a historical observation ('there were no such laws') straight to a policy conclusion ('there should be none'), a non-sequitur that skips the question actually at issue — whether the laws do more good than harm today. Establishing that societies once managed without a rule does not establish that abolishing it now would leave people no worse off.

Rejecting the premises

[Rejecting P1] That drinking-age laws are a recent invention, or absent in some countries, is an appeal to tradition; seatbelt, food-safety and child-labour laws are also modern inventions absent in parts of the world yet plainly beneficial. [Rejecting P3] The claim that such laws 'have little effect on underage drinking' is contested — studies of minimum-age laws report reductions in youth drinking and alcohol-related traffic deaths — so the empirical premise is not established.