Joe Biden would reverse America's historic economic slump

The argument

This argument, made in the run-up to the 2020 election, holds that Joe Biden would be a good president because he was the candidate equipped to reverse the historic economic slump into which the coronavirus pandemic had plunged the United States. By mid-2020 the American economy had suffered its sharpest contraction on record, with output collapsing and tens of millions filing unemployment claims as the pandemic shut down activity. Recovering from a shock of that scale, supporters argued, would be the central task of the next presidency — and Biden had uniquely relevant experience, having served as vice president during the recovery from the 2008 financial crisis, where he was charged with overseeing the implementation of the Recovery Act, the stimulus programme credited with helping pull the economy out of the Great Recession. He had, in short, already helped manage the rebuilding of a wrecked economy once. Supporters also pointed to the plan he offered: a 'Build Back Better' agenda proposing major public investment in infrastructure, clean energy, manufacturing and caregiving, designed not merely to restore the pre-pandemic economy but to generate millions of jobs and address weaknesses the crisis had exposed. And because the slump was bound up with the virus itself, they argued his commitment to a serious public-health response was inseparable from recovery: the economy could not heal while the pandemic raged unchecked. From this standpoint, the 2020 election was above all about who could rebuild, and Biden offered tested experience and a concrete programme for doing so. Because Joe Biden would reverse America's historic economic slump, this argument holds, he would be a good president.

Premises

Counter-arguments

Critics of this argument note that the recovery it forecast was driven mainly by forces external to the presidency. The 2020 collapse was caused by a virus and by the restrictions imposed to contain it, so the rebound was always going to follow vaccine availability and reopening; the largest fiscal support had already been legislated on a bipartisan basis before the transition, and monetary policy was set by an independent central bank. Attributing the recovery to whoever held office is difficult when the mechanism was largely outside that office's control. The experience offered as a credential is also double-edged. The recovery from the 2008 crisis is widely described by economists as slow, and a common criticism at the time and since is that the stimulus was too small and too briefly sustained. Citing a role in overseeing it invites the reply that this is a record of an insufficient response rather than a demonstration of capability. The programme, too, was a proposal. Much of the Build Back Better agenda was not enacted, having required congressional majorities it did not command; and critics argue that the stimulus that did pass contributed to the inflation that followed, a question on which economists remain divided. Finally, the argument is single-issue by construction: whether someone would be a good president spans foreign policy, appointments, institutional stewardship and much else that economic management alone cannot settle.

Rejecting the premises

[Rejecting P2] The 2008 recovery is commonly criticised as slow and the stimulus as undersized, so a role in overseeing it is contested evidence rather than a straightforward credential. [Rejecting P3] Build Back Better was a proposal requiring congressional majorities and was substantially not enacted, while the rebound followed vaccine availability and reopening — outcomes largely outside presidential control.