- Position‹2 of 2
- No, political correctness doesn't harm society
If a person claims that their speech faces backlash because it breaks the status quo, they can deflect criticism of it.
The argument
In public discourse, prominent individuals often face criticism for their statements, particularly those that target disadvantaged groups of people. The criticized person then blames political correctness for their comment's unpopularity. This is because it is much easier to blame larger, cultural perceptions of propriety for your position's unpopularity than it is to defend the position's merit. Intrinsically, political correctness is not negative. It simply implies conforming to understood norms of language and behavior that prevent making the disadvantaged uncomfortable. By blaming political correctness to deflect criticism, people have selfishly demonized a positive concept. In this way, people have given political correctness a negative connotation.
Premises
Counter-arguments
Although some individuals might disparage political correctness for selfish reasons, it is wrong to assume that every critic of this standard is motivated in this way. Many could genuinely be distressed by political correctness, recognizing its restrictive nature and potential to harm our communities. The ill-intentioned criticism of political correctness does not negate valid concern about this standard.
Rejecting the premises
[Rejecting P1] Even granting that some people invoke the term to deflect criticism, the premise describes a rhetorical habit and establishes nothing about the practice itself. [Rejecting P2] The definition offered — conforming to norms that avoid discomfort for the disadvantaged — builds the favourable verdict into the term. The rival position disputes exactly that characterisation, holding that what is at issue is the scope of those norms and how they are enforced. [Rejecting P3] The conclusion does not follow. Showing that some critics are motivated by self-interest leaves the substance of their objections untouched, which is the counter-argument's point that bad-faith criticism does not dispose of good-faith concern.