The powers held by religion are social

The argument

The argument treats God as a thought form by locating the powers of religion in the social world rather than in anything supernatural. When the powers held by institutionalised religion are discussed, proponents argue, they are best understood in the same terms used for any other social institution: religious bodies command resources, confer authority, set expectations and sanction those who depart from them, and these are the mechanisms by which a state, a legal system or a large corporation also operates. The claim follows that there is nothing particularly unique about God as a category. On this account it is another idea competing within the contest of ideas that shapes what people believe and how they behave, subject to the same dynamics as any other: it spreads through transmission, is sustained by institutions with an interest in sustaining it, and holds its position for as long as those conditions last. Proponents are careful to distinguish this from a claim that religion is weak or inconsequential. The point is not that the idea lacks force. The idea of God has controlled entire societies and continues to hold considerable sway, determining laws, organising daily life and directing the behaviour of populations over long periods. That is a substantial power by any measure, and treating it as an idea rather than as a supernatural fact does not diminish it. What the argument does instead is relocate the source of that power. When people reference the power of God, whether or not they recognise it, they are referencing the power wielded by religious institutions and by the belief itself as a social force. The effects attributed to a deity are, on this reading, the observable effects of an idea operating through the organisations that carry it, which is what it means to call God a thought form.

Premises

Counter-arguments

This answers a different question from the one asked. The question is what God is; the argument describes the powers of religious institutions. Those are separable: that churches, temples and clergy wield social influence of an ordinary sociological kind is compatible with every position on offer, including that God is the fundamental substance. The reality of the natural world is not affected by the sociology of universities, and by the same token an account of how religious organisations accumulate authority leaves the existence and nature of their object untouched. The inference also runs the wrong way. From the observation that people invoking divine power are often describing institutional power, nothing follows about whether the object of belief is real — that is an explanation of belief substituted for an assessment of it. And the pivotal claim, that there is "nothing particularly unique about god, it is just another idea", is asserted rather than argued. The concept differs from ordinary ideas in precisely the respect at issue: it purports to refer to something beyond the social world. Classifying it as one idea among others competing for influence assumes that this reference fails, which is the conclusion the argument was meant to reach.

Rejecting the premises

[Rejecting P1] Describing religion's powers in institutional terms is consistent with God existing independently of those institutions, so the analogy with other social institutions does not establish that God is merely an idea. [Rejecting P2] That the idea of God has moved societies shows the influence of belief, and explaining belief's effects does not bear on whether its object is real — the argument offers an account of religion in place of an answer about God.