Encyclopedia of Opinion
Question
Are Holocaust comparisons OK?
Position2 of 2
Holocaust comparisons are appropriate only under specific conditions
Argument2 of 3

The survivors and ancestors have licence to express themselves however they please

The argument

This argument holds that one of the specific conditions under which Holocaust comparisons are appropriate concerns who is speaking: survivors, and the descendants of victims and survivors, have a licence to invoke and compare their own family's tragedy however they please — a licence others do not automatically share. The basis of the distinction is ownership of the experience. For Jewish and Romani families, the Holocaust is not a rhetorical resource but inherited memory: grandparents murdered, survivors' trauma passed down through generations, absences at every family table. When a survivor or descendant compares some present-day development to the catastrophe their family lived, they are processing, warning from, and keeping faith with their own history — exercising authority over a story that is theirs. The moral failure in casual Holocaust comparison is appropriation: outsiders seizing someone else's atrocity as a convenient superlative. That failure cannot be committed by the people the atrocity happened to. This asymmetry is familiar across moral life: members of a community may speak of their own suffering in ways outsiders may not, because the speaker's relationship to the wound changes what the speech is. A survivor's comparison carries testimony and vigilance — 'I have seen where this leads' — where a stranger's identical words carry only borrowed gravity. The condition, proponents stress, defines rather than abolishes the rule: comparisons are not generally acceptable, and outsiders still need strong justification; but the gate is open to those whose inheritance the Holocaust is. From this standpoint, the right question about any Holocaust comparison includes who is making it. Because survivors and the descendants of victims have licence to express themselves about their own tragedy however they please, this argument holds, Holocaust comparisons are appropriate under specific conditions.

Premises

[P1]For survivors and descendants the Holocaust is inherited memory and family history, not a rhetorical resource. [P2] The moral failure in casual comparison is appropriation of someone else's atrocity, which cannot be committed by those it happened to. [P3] A survivor's comparison carries testimony and warning — authority over their own story — where a stranger's identical words carry only borrowed gravity. [C] Therefore, because survivors and descendants have licence to express themselves about their own tragedy, Holocaust comparisons are appropriate under specific conditions.

Counter-arguments

The relationship the argument describes is real, and the difficulty is that the inheritance is shared rather than individually held. Survivors and descendants do not agree with one another about which comparisons are legitimate: invocations by some Jewish public figures have been objected to, publicly and sharply, by other Jewish public figures, by survivor organisations and by Holocaust memorial institutions. If descent conferred a licence, both parties in those disputes would hold it, and the licence would settle nothing about the comparison at issue. There is no single body able to grant it because the memory belongs to a community that is internally divided about its use. The argument also collapses two distinct objections to casual comparison. One is appropriation — taking someone else's catastrophe as a rhetorical resource — and the speaker's identity does answer that. The other is trivialisation and historical distortion: a comparison that flattens the differences making the analogy false misdescribes what happened, and it misdescribes it identically whoever makes it. A descendant's inaccurate comparison is still inaccurate, and it is the second objection that the position's own framework is built around, since 'appropriate only under specific conditions' names conditions on the comparison rather than on the person. 'However they please' is also stronger than the position requires and stronger than the reasoning supports. It licenses comparisons that are historically wrong, instrumentally deployed for partisan advantage, or made to attack another victim group — none of which the argument gives a reason to permit, and some of which have caused real harm. And the criterion is undefined at its edges. Descent is now several generations deep, unevenly documented and not self-evidently bounded; a rule keyed to it needs a test the argument does not supply.

Rejecting the premises

[Rejecting P1] The relationship is real, but the inheritance is shared and its holders disagree: comparisons made by some descendants have been publicly objected to by others, by survivor organisations and by memorial institutions, so there is no single party able to grant the licence. [Rejecting P2] Appropriation is one objection to casual comparison; trivialisation and historical distortion are another, and the speaker's identity does not cure the second — an inaccurate comparison misdescribes the history whoever makes it. [Rejecting P3] 'However they please' is stronger than the position requires, licensing comparisons that are historically wrong or deployed for partisan advantage. The position's own conditions attach to the comparison rather than to the speaker, which is a different kind of test, and descent several generations deep would need a criterion the argument does not supply.