Torture doesn't work

The argument

The objection here is not that torture is cruel but that it fails at the task it is defended for performing. Torture is justified, when it is justified at all, on the grounds that it extracts information that could not be obtained otherwise. This argument holds that the physiological effects of torture make the information it produces unreliable, because the same treatment that breaks a person's resistance also damages the faculties any confession depends on. The mechanism runs through memory. Chronic and severe stress compromises integrated psychological functioning, and among the things it compromises are the areas of the brain associated with memory. A person under that stress has impaired recall, which is already fatal to the purpose of an interrogation. Worse, the impairment does not simply produce gaps. It facilitates the incorporation of information contained in leading questions, so that material introduced by the interrogator can be absorbed into what the captive then reports as memory. The captive comes to believe an account supplied to them, and the interrogator receives what appears to be independent corroboration of their own hypothesis. What makes this especially damaging is that the process is subtle enough that neither party need be aware of it. The captive does not know that what they are recalling was handed to them, and the interrogator does not know that the confirmation they have received is an echo. There is therefore no internal check available to either side. Torture fails during interrogation because it assaults the integrated social, psychological and neural functioning that reliable testimony rests on. This is not a marginal view: experts overwhelmingly agree both that torture produces unreliable information and that it undermines attempts to get detainees to cooperate. Because torture does not work, this argument concludes, it cannot be justified.

Premises

Counter-arguments

Those who hold that torture can sometimes be justified argue that 'it doesn't work' is an empirical claim which, even if generally true, does not establish it never works, and that the justification debate usually turns on rare 'ticking-bomb' cases where proponents claim coercion has produced actionable information. They also note the effectiveness question is logically separate from the moral one: were torture shown to work in some case, the 'doesn't work' argument would collapse, whereas the strongest case against torture is that it is wrong even when effective. Critics thus argue this argument rests its whole conclusion on a contested empirical premise rather than on principle.

Rejecting the premises

[Rejecting P3] 'Experts overwhelmingly agree it is unreliable' concerns the average case; it does not establish that torture never yields accurate information, which the categorical conclusion requires. [Rejecting C] Grounding the objection solely in effectiveness makes it hostage to the facts: were torture shown to work in some case, this argument would license it, which is why many opponents rest the case on principle instead.