A Green New Deal will facilitate relations within the European Union (EU)

The argument

In a post COVID-19 existence, a Green New Deal will facilitate relations within the European Union. The argument rests on a continuity between two efforts that look unrelated: the EU collaborated to do its best to slow COVID-19's march across the world by closing borders, boosting European solidarity and working on economic protection — and in doing so it practised exactly the kind of coordination that a bloc-wide climate programme will require. The pandemic response was, in effect, a demonstration that member states can act together under pressure and at speed. While the virus is far from over or annihilated in Europe, this sort of international cooperation may very well trickle into the EU's announced efforts towards its own Green New Deal. What transfers is not policy but habit and expectation: states that have recently coordinated borders, spending and public health measures have established the working relationships and the political precedent that a climate programme can build on. The climate commitments are demanding enough to need that foundation. Europe now aspires towards a bloc-wide goal of net zero carbon emissions by 2050, and a 50%-55% cut in emissions by 2030 compared with 1990 levels. Targets of that kind cannot be met member state by member state in isolation, since energy systems, industry and transport cross borders; a bloc-wide goal only means anything if the bloc acts as one in pursuing it. That shared undertaking is what the argument expects to bind the Union together. Collaborating towards a morally and ethically sound goal gives member states a common project for the coming decades, uniting them as they strive towards a better world and recover from COVID-19 at the same time.

Premises

Counter-arguments

The Green New Deal will fail to facilitate relations within the European Union as once it becomes clear how citizens' lifestyles will be affected, disinterest in the Green New Deal will expand beyond borders. “The green agenda will meet more and more opposition as voters start to realise it will make them poorer and affect their lifestyles, and they will worry about Europe becoming less competitive than, say, India and China, which won’t be going carbon-neutral,” says Charles Grant, director of the Centre for European Reform think tank. “This will increase the electoral strength of populists.” Furthermore, Europe has routinely struggled with an imbalance of power within the European Union. The efforts towards carbon neutrality will be yet another example of stronger countries (France, Germany) dictating efforts and policies of weaker ones.

Rejecting the premises

[Rejecting P1] Border closures were unilateral national decisions, several taken ahead of or against bloc-level coordination, so the pandemic response is at best mixed evidence of a cooperative capacity to carry forward. [Rejecting P2] Shared emissions targets are the easy part; the disputes arise in allocating cost between member states, and as the counter notes the burden falls unevenly on coal-dependent economies — so a common objective is as likely to expose that imbalance as to dissolve it.