Interpretivism uses smaller data samples

The argument

Using fewer sources is a methodological choice that has merit in academic research as it allows for a more targeted approach and it can also be the only choice if the research topic doesn't have enough evidence. It also allows the researcher to spend more time in interpreting the evidence that could have been spend in collecting sources. This way it is also possible to avoid entering the realm of other academic disciplines, which would necessitate expert knowledge in a different academic field (e.g. historians could incorporate archaeological evidence in their research, however they may be ill-equipped to interpret it.)

Premises

Counter-arguments

The argument defends a practical convenience and treats it as a philosophical merit. Sample size is a methodological choice available within any research philosophy — positivist work uses small samples in case-control and single-case designs, and interpretivist work sometimes analyses very large bodies of text — so it does not characterise interpretivism, which is defined by its claims about meaning, subjectivity and the interpretive nature of social knowledge rather than by how many sources it consults. Several of the reasons given are not merits at all. That fewer sources may be "the only choice if the research topic doesn't have enough evidence" describes a constraint, not an advantage. That time saved in collection can be spent on interpretation is a trade-off whose value depends on the interpretation being well founded, which a thin evidence base makes harder rather than easier. And avoiding other disciplines' evidence in order to sidestep the need for expertise inverts a weakness into a virtue: the risk of misreading archaeological material is an argument for collaboration or training, not for declining to consult relevant evidence, and deliberately leaving available material unexamined is difficult to defend as good practice. The standard interpretivist case for small-n work is quite different and much stronger — depth, thick description, and understanding rather than generalisation, with credibility established through reflexivity, saturation and triangulation. Resting instead on economy of effort concedes the ground on which the positivist sibling position attacks it.

Rejecting the premises

[Rejecting P1] Sample size is a methodological choice available within any research philosophy — positivist work uses small samples in case-control and single-case designs — so it does not characterise interpretivism, which is defined by its claims about meaning and interpretation. [Rejecting P2] Insufficient available evidence is a constraint rather than a merit, and avoiding other disciplines' evidence to sidestep the need for expertise argues for collaboration or training rather than for leaving relevant material unexamined. [Rejecting P3] The stronger interpretivist case rests on depth, thick description and understanding over generalisation, with credibility secured through reflexivity, saturation and triangulation — grounds this argument replaces with economy of effort.