It's not okay to punch anyone

The argument

When people argue in favor of punching Nazis, many point out the evils of their actions and beliefs. Nazis are characterized (accurately) as sick, twisted monsters who wish to destroy values integral to our modern, democratic society, seeking the ruin of equality, freedom, and justice. While this is certainly true, many Nazi-punching advocates miss one crucial part of every Nazi: each one of them is a human being, just like the rest of us. While this fact in no way mitigates their heinous worldviews, it is an important one to consider nonetheless-especially to a pacifist. This belief system maintains that violence is never morally justifiable, regardless of context. Instead, disputes should be settled peacefully, and human beings must be treated with respect and dignity-even ones as evil as murderers, pedophiles, and Nazis. To use violence on another human being is to violate their most basic human rights. Though this may sound like a hard pill to swallow, a widespread cultural acceptance of violence would be a reality even more difficult to deal with. By normalizing violence in any form-from war to domestic abuse to Nazi punching-we sacrifice our morality, both personally and societally. Nazis are terrible people-but people nonetheless. We must value the fundamental rights of the individual if we are to flourish as a society.

Premises

Counter-arguments

In many instances, inaction is just as powerful as action. By refusing to use force to stop the threat of facism, so-called pacifists enable the spread of the violence they claim to oppose. Though pacifism looks good on paper, it cannot be feasibly implemented into the real world without serious moral issues. Moreover, this argument implies that all violence is equally wrong and unjustifiable, when in reality, some violent acts are far worse than others. Namely, punching a Nazi is far more acceptable than facilitating the genocide of an entire race of people. It is fallacious (and profoundly Kantian) to argue that violence is never acceptable, especially when considering that some lesser violent acts can be used to prevent greater ones.

Rejecting the premises

[Rejecting P3] The counter denies that all violence carries the same moral weight, holding that some violent acts are far worse than others and that a punch does not sit on the same footing as facilitating genocide, so a blanket prohibition flattens a distinction it regards as decisive. [Rejecting C] It also argues that inaction is not neutral: declining to use force against the threat of fascism can enable the spread of the violence pacifism opposes, which on this reading makes an absolute rule against violence unworkable in practice rather than merely demanding.