- Position‹2 of 2
- Joe Biden will be better for the US economy
- Argument1 of 5›
Joe Biden will end Trump's unsuccessful trade wars
Trump oversells the success of his strongman tariff policies. This negotiation style has seen Trump repeatedly fail to meet his own year-on-year 4%+ growth pronouncements.
The argument
Trump’s hostile approach to foreign trade has not had the desired impact, costing the US economy 0.3% of GDP and the average household up to $1,000 each year. Biden plans to take a more conciliatory approach, focusing on building alliances rather than unilaterally imposing tariffs, as Trump has done. For example, Biden wants to rejoin the Paris Climate Agreement, which Trump started the process to withdraw from; renewing traditional alliances is an important step in securing the long-term prosperity and resilience. Biden’s trade and foreign policies are likely to be in the same spirit as those of the Obama presidency, where he served as vice president. This will involve repairing relations with states and alliances, such as the EU, which have been harmed by Trump’s aggression. Undoing the damage of Trump’s trade wars would bring a significant benefit to the US economy, securing trading relations and bringing stability to affected industries.
Premises
Counter-arguments
Trump’s trade policies have been successful in achieving foreign policy objectives and protecting American businesses. The imposition of tariffs has countered the race to the bottom brought about by globalisation, protecting American industry against foreign competition. At the same time, tariffs have increased government revenue significantly, bringing in $79 billion in 2019. Undoing the Trump administration’s trade deals would expose many American industries to foreign competition, driving down wages and harming businesses.
Rejecting the premises
[Rejecting P1] The figures arrive without a source, and estimates in this literature vary considerably by method and period. The premise also fixes the aim — "the desired impact" — without stating it, which makes the failure claim hard to test: judged against consumer prices the tariffs performed badly, judged against negotiating leverage or the political goal of signalling to particular industries, the assessment differs. [Rejecting P2] A stated plan is not an outcome, and the example does not support the premise: the Paris Agreement is a climate accord rather than a trade measure, so rejoining it is evidence about alliance-building in general and not about tariffs. [Rejecting P3] The prediction was largely not borne out. The Section 301 tariffs on Chinese goods were retained rather than lifted after the change of administration, several steel and aluminium measures were converted into quota arrangements rather than removed, and industrial policy through subsidy and domestic-content requirements expanded. The conclusion does not follow even if the premises hold, since trade policy is one input among many and the position's question is about overall economic performance.