- Question
- Is violence always wrong?
- Position‹2 of 3›
- No, violence is not always wrong
Human violence is not a contemporary concept, but it is deeply rooted in our ancient history. It has shaped our physical characteristics as well as our brain mechanisms. However, that doesn't mean people are allowed to be violent to each other without any cause.
The argument
Wars between chimpanzee communities were first speculated in the 1970s, and theories were raised about how such conflicts occur and what they teach us about human violence. In ancient times, Richard Wrangham argues that human males showed the same capacity for violence and dominance as male chimpanzees. Evidence from the early massacres sites shows that massive battles took place between people where mass graves with jumbles of shattered bones and pierced skulls were found. Such theories and observations confirm that violence is not a wrong and right question but rather an innate act. Humans cannot avoid it, but humans can protect themselves from giving into violence by other coping mechanisms such as exercising, running, painting, any activities to divert their attention from committing violent acts.
Premises
Counter-arguments
A biological anthropologist, Agustin Fuentes, argues that most people in the world aren't violent, so it is not correct to consider violence as an innate human trait. According to documentation by Douglas Fry, 70 societies in the world don't contribute to war at all. There is no warfare or other sorts of extreme violence they take part in. So violence cannot be excused by describing it as an innate trait, but rather should be avoided and prevented by humans for safety and peace.
Rejecting the premises
[Rejecting P1] Chimpanzee intergroup conflict and archaeological massacre sites establish a capacity for organised violence, which nobody in this debate denies. Capacity is not compulsion, and the counter's point that documented societies exist without warfare shows the trait is not universally expressed. [Rejecting P2] The inference is a non sequitur, and the argument concedes as much: it says the impulse can be diverted into other activities, which presupposes the choice it denies. That something is natural also says nothing about whether it is wrong — the same reasoning would excuse any behaviour with an evolutionary story — so the premise cannot reach a conclusion about justification at all.