Abortion is ethical when the quality of life of the human will undoubtedly be very poor

The argument

This argument holds that abortion is ethical in certain circumstances — specifically, when it is virtually certain that the child, if born, would face a life of severe and unavoidable suffering. In some cases, prenatal diagnosis reveals conditions so grave that a baby would be born only to endure relentless pain, profound disability incompatible with any meaningful quality of life, or a short existence dominated by suffering before an early death. In such situations, proponents argue, the compassionate and ethical course can be to prevent that suffering rather than to insist the pregnancy continue regardless of what awaits the child. The reasoning rests on weighing the wellbeing of the prospective child. If the central ethical concern is the welfare of the being whose interests are at stake, then a future of near-certain, severe and unrelievable suffering is a powerful consideration. To bring a child into existence solely to experience pain and deprivation, when this could be foreseen and avoided, is not obviously the more ethical choice; choosing to spare that suffering can be an act of mercy and responsibility rather than of harm. Proponents argue that an unflinching commitment to birth in every case, even where life would be one of unremitting anguish, prioritises the fact of existence over the quality and content of the life experienced. From this standpoint, the ethics of abortion cannot be settled without regard to the kind of life a child would have, and where that life would, beyond reasonable doubt, be one of severe suffering, ending the pregnancy can be the humane and ethical decision. The relevant consideration is the welfare of the potential person, not birth at any cost. Because abortion is ethical when the quality of life of the resulting human would undoubtedly be very poor, this argument holds, abortion is ethical under such circumstances.

Premises

Counter-arguments

Critics raise several objections. First, prognostic uncertainty: prenatal predictions of 'a life of unremitting suffering' are fallible, and there are documented cases of children given grave prognoses who lived longer or with more wellbeing than predicted, so decisions of such finality rest on judgements that may be wrong. Second, disability-rights advocates argue that judging in advance which lives will be 'not worth living' devalues the lives of people already living with serious disabilities, many of whom report good quality of life, and that able-bodied observers systematically underestimate that quality — making 'severe suffering' a hazardous basis for the judgement. Third, opponents contend the reasoning is hard to confine: once quality-of-life forecasts justify ending a pregnancy, the boundary between 'undoubtedly very poor' and merely 'difficult' is contestable and may drift. Defenders reply that the argument is limited to near-certain, extreme cases; critics respond that the certainty and the moral authority to make that judgement are exactly what is in doubt.

Rejecting the premises

[Rejecting P1] Prenatal prognoses of severe, unavoidable suffering are fallible, so the near-certainty the argument relies on is often not available in practice. [Rejecting P2] Judging in advance that a future life will not be worth living is contested by disability-rights critics who note that people with serious disabilities frequently report good quality of life that observers underestimate.