The argument from non-belief: God only exists if we believe it does

The argument

Philosopher J.L. Schellenberg describes this argument in his book "Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason"(1993). He first proposes that there are people who are capable of relating and believing in God but still fail to believe. Assuming that God is unrivaled with respect to its greatness, and thus is perfectly loving, then there can be no such people who fail to believe in God’s existence. However, as those people exist, then there is no such God. Schellenberg defends this position with the argument that if God is perfectly loving and thus is always open to personal relationships with every person, then no human being could ever be unaware of God’s existence and fail to believe in God. Another version of the argument from non-belief comes from philosopher Theodore Drange. This argument follows Schellenberg’s original 1993 argument. Drange proposes a series of statements that must be true if God exists. These are that if God wants all humans to believe in God’s existence before they die, God can make humans believe in its existence, God does not want anything to conflict with human belief in its existence, and that God always acts in accordance with these statements. Drange supposes these notions, and from this, proposes that if God exists, then all humans would believe in its existence before they die. However, not all humans believe in the existence of God before they die. Therefore, God does not exist. In summary, the argument from non-belief asserts that because there are people who do not believe in the existence of God, God does not exist. The argument relies primarily on the assumptions that God is incomparably good and loving and that God desires for people to believe in its existence and acts accordingly. These assumptions are the most common points of critique regarding the argument from non-belief.

Premises

Counter-arguments

For the Christian philosopher Jean-Luc Marion, the silence of God is the proof of His love : if God does not reveal Himself by The Word, who, like every word, can bind possessively, it is in order to manifest, in discretion and restraint, his eternal fidelity. This is restraint that, far from weakening a relationship, strengthens it. As can the restraint of a non-possessive parent strengthen their relationship with their child. For the Jewish philosopher, André Neher, the silence of God is the condition of the free will of humankind, including not believing in Him. Others believe that the argument from non-belief places unreasonable demands on God to prove its existence. In imposing their own expectations on God, nonbelievers fail to see God as God truly is and thus are unable to believe in its existence. Philosopher Paul Moser is a proponent of this counter-argument.

Rejecting the premises

[Rejecting P1] The premise builds in an assumption a theist need not grant: that perfect love requires making one's existence impossible to miss. On several accounts a loving relationship requires freely given assent, which inescapable evidence would foreclose — the position André Neher takes in the counter. The premise also treats openness to relationship as equivalent to guaranteed belief, and the two come apart as soon as the relationship depends on the other party's response. [Rejecting P2] Non-resistant non-belief is harder to establish than the premise allows. The argument needs people who are capable of belief, who do not resist it, and who nonetheless lack it, and each condition is contested. Formation, culture and what counts as resistance are not open to inspection from outside, and defenders of the theistic position argue that the relevant capacity itself involves a disposition the argument has no way to verify. [Rejecting P3] The conclusion outruns the premises. What follows, if the reasoning holds, is that one particular conception of God is not instantiated — perfectly loving, personal, and wanting universal explicit belief before death. It leaves untouched conceptions on which God is not personal, does not aim at propositional belief, or has reasons for hiddenness the argument's own scheme cannot exclude. Drange's version makes this plain by listing the assumptions it requires, which is also where they can be denied.

Framing

The argument from nonbelief asserts that God does not exist because of the existence of people who do not believe in God’s existence. The basis of the argument stems from divine hiddenness, the idea that God is hidden and absent from his people. With respect to this argument, divine hiddenness is used as context for the existence of non-believers (people who cannot see or otherwise experience God, and therefore do not believe in his existence). Nietzsche asked: "a god who is all-knowing and all-powerful and who does not even make sure his creatures understand his intentions — could that be a god of goodness?"