Religion gives us our morals

The argument

The moral argument implicitly rests upon accepting moral realism and, in particular, Divine Command Deontology as the only possible source for moral realism. It takes a very simple form but is nonetheless emotionally appealing to many, and its force depends on two ideas worth separating before it is assessed. Moral realism refers to the idea that there are objective ethical statements that ought to be pursued — claims that hold independently of what any particular person or culture happens to approve of. Deontology is a subset of theories in normative ethics which postulate that to be good is to fulfill some pre-established duties, regardless of what consequences might be triggered from those actions. So for example if lying is truly bad, Kant argued, one must refrain from lying even if it seems to us that we could achieve a greater good (say saving someone's life) by doing it. The duty binds because of what it is, not because of what it brings about. Divine command theory is a form of deontology whereby the aforementioned duties are equated with what a hypothetical God wants from us. That move supplies what a duty-based ethics otherwise has to leave unexplained: an authority capable of establishing obligations that bind regardless of consequence, and capable of doing so for everyone rather than only for those who happen to agree. An argument from morality begins from the conclusion that moral realism is true, and moreover that this could only be so if there's a divine being to ascertain and distinguish good from evil. If both of those claims are granted, then the existence of such a being follows from the existence of morality itself.

Context

18th century philosopher Immanuel Kant championed moral arguments for the existence of God, as part of his larger deontological ethical framework. In his "Critique of Practical Reason" he argued that if achieving perfect happiness was the ultimate moral goal, then it could only be so because a God would have the power to provide for such a state of affairs.

Premises

Counter-arguments

Euthyphro dilemma Plato rejected moral arguments on the basis that divine opinion is no better a source of absolute values than human subjectivity, God being a subjective being by definition. That is, simply saying that a deity prefers certain actions falls short of proving the deity's preferred value ought to be intrinsically good. On the other hand, if certain values were intrinsically good that would have to be the case regardless of whether a God recognizes them or not.

Rejecting the premises

Premise 1 postulates that divine command deontology is the correct ethical theory, yet provides no proof that all of the alternative theories are false (contractualist deontology, any form of consequentialism, etc.) Premise 2 is false if morality is subjective (relative to the observer) or if moral nihilism is true (no values exist whatsoever).