Believing in conspiracy theories is comforting

The argument

This argument explains belief in conspiracy theories as a cognitive reaction rather than as a failure of reasoning: the theories are believed because believing them is comforting. The comfort lies in what they replace. On a psychological level it is easier to think of events as part of a wider plan than as the product of chance. Anyone who stops to consider it finds that the complexity and randomness of the world is all-encompassing and terrifying — a world in which things happen for no reason offers nothing to hold on to and no way to anticipate what comes next. It is far more calming to think of the world as predictable, and a conspiracy, however malign the conspirators, supplies exactly that: a plan, an intention and someone in charge. The need is held to be more acute now than in the past. In the modern age people feel increasingly removed from any sort of community or belief, and that detachment produces anxiety. Conspiracy theories, on this account, calm those anxieties. The strongest form of the comfort appears in the hardest cases. For many it is cognitively pleasurable to see terrifying world events, such as 9/11, as part of an ongoing global conspiracy — because an atrocity that was planned is at least intelligible, where one that simply happened is not. The parallel drawn is with religion. This is the same instinct that has led people to turn to faith: a response to the fear of the randomness of life and of our corresponding mortality. On this reading people are inclined to believe in conspiracy theories simply because the alternative is terrifying — a cognitive reaction to the world rather than a considered judgment about it.

Premises

Counter-arguments

Critics argue the 'comfort' account is incomplete and sometimes backwards. Many conspiracy beliefs are frightening rather than reassuring — that shadowy elites control events, that a lethal plot is underway — so believers often end up more anxious, not calmed. If the drive were simply to feel comforted, it is not obvious why people would adopt beliefs that heighten fear and distrust. They add that the debate's other positions offer explanations the comfort account does not cover: distrust of mainstream institutions, social and group-identity factors, and psychological needs such as a sense of control, certainty or feeling special. Research points more to pattern-detection gone awry, motivated reasoning and the desire to understand or predict a threatening world than to comfort as such. On this view comfort may play a part for some, but singling it out as the reason oversimplifies a phenomenon the rival positions attribute to several interacting causes.

Rejecting the premises

[Rejecting P1] Critics note many conspiracy theories are alarming rather than soothing — positing hidden malign control — so believing them frequently increases anxiety, undercutting 'comfort' as the driver. [Rejecting C] Comfort is one possible factor among several; distrust, social identity, and needs for control or uniqueness (the debate's other positions) may explain belief better, so comfort does not establish the cognitive-reaction account on its own.