There are Social motives for believing in conspiracy theories

The argument

Members of groups who have objectively low (vs. high) status because of their ethnicity or income are more likely to endorse conspiracy theories. The prevalence of anti-semitic conspiracy theories in certain BAME communities is evidence of this (eg. Nick Cannon's attack on the Jewish community, for which he subsequently apologised) People on the losing (vs. winning) side of political processes also appear more likely to believe conspiracy theories. This type of justification of Conspiracy Theory is about shielding the in-group from blame, claiming it is the moral and competent one, but has been sabotaged by others. This type of conspiracy ideation is also particularly appealing to groups who find the positive image of their self or in-group threatened.

Premises

Counter-arguments

There is a tension between the argument and the position it supports. The factors it cites — low group status, being on the losing side of politics, defending the in-group's image — are by its own description social motives, which fits the sibling position that 'social factors make people believe conspiracy theories' at least as well as the 'psychological reasons' heading under which it sits; the argument blurs the very distinction the question's positions are meant to draw. Its evidence is also correlational: that lower-status or politically-losing groups endorse conspiracies more often does not establish that a psychological motive to protect self-image is doing the causal work, as opposed to differences in information environment, trust, or real experiences of being wronged. Singling out one anecdote, Nick Cannon, illustrates the trope but cannot demonstrate the underlying mechanism. The account may capture a genuine correlate of conspiracy belief while mislabelling a social pattern as a psychological cause.

Rejecting the premises

[Rejecting P1] The cited drivers — group status, political loss, in-group defence — are social rather than psychological, fitting the sibling 'social factors' position and blurring the intended category. [Rejecting P2] The evidence is correlational, so higher endorsement among low-status or losing groups need not stem from a psychological motive to protect self-image rather than from their information environment or real grievances.