Appoint officers of the federal government, judiciary, and Ambassadors with Senate approval

The argument

Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution states that the president "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States." On this reading, the appointment power is one of the enumerated powers vested in the Executive Branch: the text places the act of nominating squarely with the president, and it is the president who ultimately appoints once the Senate has given its advice and consent. The clause thus makes staffing the government's leadership an executive function, exercised at the president's initiative even though it is completed jointly with the Senate. The scope of the clause is notably broad. It covers the diplomatic corps — ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls — as well as judges of the Supreme Court, and then extends beyond these named offices to "all other Officers of the United States." Proponents of this view point out that this catch-all language makes the appointment power a general one: it is not confined to a short list of posts but reaches across the federal government and the judiciary. Whoever holds office as an officer of the United States, on this account, traces that office back to a presidential nomination and appointment. Because the clause conditions appointment on the Advice and Consent of the Senate, the power is a shared, structured authority rather than a unilateral one: the president proposes, the Senate checks, and the president then appoints. That structure supports the position that among the executive powers under Article II is precisely this authority — to appoint officers of the federal government, the judiciary, and ambassadors with Senate approval.

Premises

Counter-arguments

The clause quoted describes a shared power rather than an executive one. The president nominates, but cannot appoint without the advice and consent of the Senate, and a Senate that declines to act on a nomination can leave an office unfilled indefinitely — as with the Supreme Court vacancy left open through 2016. Classifying the appointment of judges under Executive Powers also sits oddly beside the question's own categories, since naming Supreme Court justices is the executive's participation in constituting a different branch, and a separate position for Judicial Powers exists alongside this one. The quotation is incomplete in a way that bears on the claim. The same section permits Congress to vest the appointment of inferior officers in the president alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, so "all other Officers of the United States" are not in fact the president's to fill; a great many federal appointments are made without any presidential involvement. The recess-appointment clause that follows — which does allow temporary appointment without the Senate — is the genuinely unilateral portion of the power and goes unmentioned. As posed, the argument consists of a single quoted sentence and states the clause without arguing that it belongs in this category rather than another.

Rejecting the premises

[Rejecting P1] The clause quoted makes the power shared rather than executive alone: the president nominates but cannot appoint without Senate consent, and a Senate's refusal to act can leave an office vacant, as the Supreme Court seat left open through 2016 illustrates. [Rejecting P2] The same section lets Congress vest the appointment of inferior officers in the courts or in department heads, so "all other Officers" are not all the president's to fill, while the recess-appointment clause — the genuinely unilateral part of the power — goes unmentioned.