Trump has invigorated US defense, and protected its military, by increasing pay, introducing family leave for all federal workers, and increasing the defense budget to a colossal $738 billion for the 2020 fiscal year.
The argument
This argument, made by supporters in the 2020 campaign, holds that Donald Trump should be re-elected because he strengthened American defence: rebuilding the military's funding and readiness and reasserting US strength as the foundation of national security. The case rests on his record on the armed forces. Supporters pointed to the substantial increases in the defence budget secured under his administration, which they framed as reversing a period of underinvestment — funding new equipment, modernising the nuclear arsenal, raising military pay, and restoring readiness and stockpiles they argued had been depleted. They highlighted the creation of the Space Force as a new branch addressing an emerging domain of conflict, and pressed NATO allies to spend more on their own defence, which they credited with increasing the alliance's collective contributions. The underlying philosophy, encapsulated in 'peace through strength', holds that a visibly powerful and well-funded military deters adversaries and prevents war by making aggression too costly to attempt. The significance for the election follows from the primacy of security. A government's first duty is to protect the nation, and supporters argued that a rebuilt, better-funded and more capable military is the bedrock of that protection in a dangerous world of great-power rivalry. A president who restored military strength, on this view, made the country safer and more respected, and re-electing him would sustain that investment rather than risk reverting to the neglect they believed had preceded it. From this standpoint, a strengthened defence is among the most consequential achievements a president can claim. Because Donald Trump strengthened US defence, this argument holds, he should be re-elected in the 2020 US election.
Premises
Counter-arguments
Critics reply that the case measures inputs rather than outcomes. Budget totals are appropriations, not capability: the increases continued a trajectory that had already resumed after the sequestration years, readiness and maintenance backlogs are governed by force structure and industrial capacity rather than by headline spending, and the nuclear modernisation programme cited was initiated under the previous administration. The Space Force reorganised existing Air Force space commands rather than adding forces, and its creation had been proposed in Congress beforehand. The alliance claim is disputed on causation. The commitment to move toward 2% of GDP was agreed at the 2014 Wales summit following the annexation of Crimea, and European and Canadian spending had been rising since then, so the increases predate the pressure credited with producing them — while critics argue the manner of that pressure, including public doubt cast on whether the United States would honour Article 5, weakened the deterrent the alliance itself supplies. Deterrence is finally judged by what adversaries do, and critics point to continued Russian and Chinese activity through the period, and to withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the Iran nuclear agreement, as loosening constraints rather than adding them. The argument is also silent on the sequence of departures among senior defence officials and on the disputes over deploying the military domestically, both of which critics treat as bearing on institutional strength. Defenders answer that appropriations and burden-sharing are the levers a president actually holds — a reply that concedes the case is about inputs.
Rejecting the premises
[Rejecting P1] Critics reply that budget totals are inputs rather than outcomes: the increases continued a trajectory resumed after the sequestration years, nuclear modernisation was initiated under the previous administration, and the Space Force reorganised existing Air Force commands rather than adding capability. [Rejecting P2] The 2% pledge was agreed at the 2014 Wales summit after the annexation of Crimea and allied spending had been rising since, so the increases predate the pressure credited for them — while public doubt cast on Article 5 is argued to have weakened the alliance's deterrent value. [Rejecting P3] Deterrence is judged by adversaries' conduct, and critics point to continued Russian and Chinese activity alongside withdrawal from the INF Treaty and the Iran agreement as loosening constraints rather than strengthening security.