Iran should reconsider its unwavering support for Assad

The argument

This argument identifies Iran as one of the outside powers whose involvement has kept the Syrian war going, and argues that ending the internationalisation of the conflict has to begin with Iran reconsidering a commitment it has treated as non-negotiable. The commitment is structural rather than sentimental. The 'Axis of Resistance' is a political alliance consisting of Iran first, the Assad government in Syria and the Lebanese group Hezbollah. Within that alliance Syria occupies a position no other state can fill: it is the only Arab government allied with Iran, which makes it both Iran's sole conventional partner in the Arab world and the land route by which weapons reach Hezbollah in Lebanon. Bashar al-Assad remaining in office is therefore not one Iranian interest among many but the precondition for the others. So long as he serves as president, transits of weapons to the Lebanese Shia resistance continue, and the Iranian Shia resistance movement retains its position in the region. Remove him and the corridor closes. That calculation explains the scale of what has been committed. Over the past nine years Iran has spent billions of dollars to keep the Assad government ruling in Syria. The expenditure has not been confined to money: to protect Assad, Iran has drawn in Hezbollah fighters as well as militiamen from Iraq and Iran itself, sent to protect Shia holy sites and to assist pro-Assad forces in the fighting. Each of those steps turns a Syrian conflict further into a regional one, adding foreign combatants, foreign command structures and foreign stakes to a war being fought on Syrian ground. The consequence is that the war is no longer one that Syrians alone can end, because the parties with the greatest capacity to sustain it are not Syrian. If the internationalisation of the conflict is to stop, Iran would have to reconsider its unwavering support for Assad and accept an outcome not defined by keeping him in place.

Premises

Counter-arguments

Critics of this prescription argue that singling out Iran ignores the symmetrical external involvement of Russia, Turkey, the Gulf states and the US-led coalition, so asking Iran alone to withdraw would not de-internationalise a conflict sustained by many outside powers, and might merely shift the balance rather than end the fighting. They note Iran regards its Syrian foothold as a core strategic interest it will not surrender for others' benefit, which makes a unilateral reconsideration unrealistic without reciprocal steps. Ending the internationalisation of the war, they contend, requires a negotiated, mutual drawdown by all external backers rather than a demand placed on one of them.

Rejecting the premises

[Rejecting P3] Iran is one of several external backers — alongside Russia, Turkey, Gulf states and the US-led coalition — so its withdrawal alone would not end the conflict's internationalisation. [Rejecting C] Iran treats its Syrian foothold as a core strategic interest, so a unilateral reconsideration is unrealistic; de-internationalisation would require a reciprocal drawdown by all outside powers.