Encyclopedia of Opinion
Question
What are the solutions to the Syrian crisis?
Position2 of 4
Regional actors must delegitimise the Islamic State’s existence
Argument3 of 3

The oil trade with Islamic State ought to come to an end

Countries must stop all oil trade with Islamic State forces.

The argument

Finance and funding is where its hits the hardest for these militias. Without enough funding the Islamic State will become a lot weaker and eventually cease to exist. The Islamic State has been selling oil to a web of buyers which has allowed for the longevity of the group's survival. When these transactions stop, the funding required for keeping the petroleum technicians and engineers will disappear, and the decline in production will eventually have a huge effect on the terrorist group's operations.

Premises

[P1]Finance is the Islamic State's weakest point, and it has sustained itself by selling oil to a web of buyers. [P2] Ending these oil transactions would cut the funding needed for its petroleum technicians and engineers, collapsing production and crippling the group's operations. [C] Therefore, ending the oil trade with the Islamic State would help regional actors delegitimise and dismantle it.

Counter-arguments

Oil was one revenue stream among several, and not the foundation the argument takes it to be. Analyses of Islamic State's finances consistently found that taxation and extortion of the large population under its control was the bigger and more durable source — levies on wages, businesses, transport and agriculture, alongside seized bank assets, confiscated property, kidnapping for ransom and the antiquities trade. A group that could tax several million people did not depend on selling crude to survive. The prediction the argument makes has since been tested directly. Coalition strikes on wellheads, refining capacity and tanker convoys, together with the loss of territory, removed effectively all of the group's oil production by 2017–19. It did not cease to exist. It reverted to insurgency, financed by extortion, kidnapping and reserves, and has continued to operate. Losing the oil weakened it considerably — the argument is right that finance matters — but the specific claim that ending the trade would collapse the organisation did not hold. The mechanism also assumes an availability the situation did not offer. A substantial share of the oil was consumed inside the territory the group controlled and sold through smuggling networks operating across contested borders; ending those transactions was a matter of military and enforcement action rather than a decision that the regional actors addressed here could simply take. Finally, the argument sits awkwardly against the position it is filed under, which holds that regional actors must *delegitimise* the group's existence. Cutting a revenue stream is a coercive financial measure; it does not address the group's claim to religious and political authority, which is what delegitimisation means and what the position asserts is required.

Rejecting the premises

[Rejecting P1] Oil was one stream among several rather than the group's foundation: taxation and extortion of the population under its control, seized bank assets, confiscated property, kidnapping and antiquities also funded it, with internal taxation generally assessed as the larger and more durable source. [Rejecting P2] The prediction has been tested. The group lost effectively all oil-producing capacity by 2017–19 and did not cease to exist, reverting to insurgency; and much of the trade was internal or ran through smuggling networks that required military and enforcement action rather than a decision by regional governments.