Neither Britain or Ireland have Northern Irish interests at heart

The argument

This argument holds that the usual choice — remain with Britain or join a united Ireland — offers two versions of the same problem, because neither capital has Northern Irish interests at heart. On the first option, proponents argue the British government has long shown disdain for Northern Ireland and its interests, and that the British population has shown disdain for Irish people and their history. Rule from London is therefore not a neutral constitutional arrangement but a relationship in which the region's concerns are treated as peripheral. The second option, on this argument, would reproduce that neglect from a different direction. In a united Ireland the crippling cost of administering the region from Dublin would ensure the same levels of disdain — an expensive province acquired by a state that has not governed it, and that would come to resent the expense. The complaint is not about the nationality of the government but about the position Northern Ireland would occupy within it: a costly addition to someone else's priorities either way. The argument then reinterprets the conflict itself in those terms. The divisions in Northern Ireland — unionists against loyalists, Catholics against Protestants — are centred on Ireland and Britain rather than on the unique identities and struggles of Ulster people. If the antagonism is organised around which external state one belongs to, then removing both claims removes the axis the quarrel runs along. Northern Ireland would therefore be best off going independent, so that its government would truly care about its people, and so that people there could govern themselves from Belfast rather than from London or Dublin. The prize, on this argument, is a politics organised around a common Ulster identity rather than around Protestant or Catholic, Irish or British affiliation — something neither existing option can deliver.

Context

Both England and the Republic of Ireland do not care about the question of Northern Ireland. In 1972, the New York Times reported that many members of the British Parliament and general public do not care about Northern Ireland or "the Irish problem." In 1998, the Baltimore Sun reported that while Dubliners wanted peace between Northern and Southern Ireland, Dubliners generally felt removed from the issues and violence in Northern Ireland. In 2019, a YouGov poll found that 4 out of 10 Britains said they "don't care very much or at all" about Northern Ireland. In 2020, YouGov found that 54% of Britains say "they would not be bothered either way" if Northern Ireland left the UK. Since YouGov's 2019 poll, the percentage of Britains who said they would be upset if Northern Ireland left the UK dropped from 41% to 24%. Historically, the British media has not reported much on Northern Ireland, a problem that contributes to Northern Ireland's lack of support from the country it is part of. Proponents for an independent Northern Ireland have surfaced on and off since the Partition. Such fringe political parties include the "Ulster Third Way" or the "Ulster Independence Movement" and appeal to Ulster nationalism and peace in Northern Ireland. None of these political parties have gained traction since the "Ulster Third Way" party was deregistered in December 2005.

Premises

Counter-arguments

Even though Britain has historically shown disdain for Ireland and its issues, and Ireland has similarly not cared much for Northern Ireland, many people living in Northern Ireland nationally identify themselves as either British or Irish. North Ireland relies on the relationship with the UK and Ireland.

Rejecting the premises

[Rejecting P1] Historical neglect from London does not establish that Dublin would repeat it, and the premise offers no mechanism beyond cost — a cost an independent Belfast would carry alone, without the fiscal transfer the region currently receives from Westminster. [Rejecting P2] Proximity of government does not guarantee attention to interests: Northern Ireland has had a devolved administration at Stormont for most of the period since 1998, and it has been suspended repeatedly over exactly the divisions independence is said to dissolve. [Rejecting P3] The premise treats British and Irish identification as an external imposition, but as the counter notes those identities are held in large numbers by the population itself, so a common Ulster identity would have to be built rather than merely uncovered — and independence supplies no mechanism for building it.